Lebanon Crisis: Amidst Atomization and Despair, Wider Class Revolt is Brewing

As Lebanon’s downward economic slide continues and the same corrupt political elite carries on as before, hope is giving way to despair. The October 17 movement, which at its height brought close to one in three Lebanese residents onto the streets in rejection of austerity measures, and the country’s sectarian political system appears to have receded. Yet amid huge obstacles, there are hints of a new awakening of working-class politics.

The “Rebellion of the hungry” returns

On 25 January protesters, angry at the extension of the COVID-19 lock-down until 14 February, defied the curfew and took to the streets of Tripoli, Lebanon’s second-largest city. For over four days there were violent clashes with security forces. A historic municipal building was set alight, along with other government buildings and a private institute owned by former prime minister and billionaire Najib Mikati. Protesters hurled stones, Molotov cocktails, and allegedly hand grenades, while security forces employed tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and live ammunition. In the end, one protester had been shot dead and over 400 injured. At least 40 soldiers and police suffered injuries.

Rather than recognizing the unrest as a desperate cry for emergency relief, Lebanon’s sectarian political establishment dismissed the unrest as a conspiracy, the work of outsiders, or in the words of prime-minister designate Saad Hariri, “an organized crime.”

These events have been the most violent protests since demonstrators stormed several ministries in the days following the August 4 blast which devastated much of Beirut. However, the latest riots are more reminiscent of the events which occurred in late April of last year, when during Lebanon’s first COVID-19 lockdown Tripoli saw a “rebellion of the hungry” which quickly spread throughout the country.

Tripolitans at it alone, for now…

Although there have been protests at the military tribunal in Beirut calling for the release of those arrested during the Tripoli protests, this new “rebellion of the hungry” has so far not spread beyond Tripoli.

A city of 700,000 in northern Lebanon, Tripoli has been dubbed the “bride of the Revolution” not without reason. Months after the wave of protests which erupted in October 2019 had died down elsewhere, Tripolitans were still taking to the streets. Locals refer to this as their “revolution of hunger.” Indeed, with a poverty rate estimated at 70% Tripoli is Lebanon’s poorest urban area. Reliance on the informal economy is even greater here, making the renewed lockdown that much harder to endure. However, besides misery and desperation, alienation from the sectarian political system also runs high. In this Sunni-majority city, people feel abandoned by Sunni political leaders. As Ghada Saraf, a 39 female protester put it; “Our MPs are among Lebanon’s richest men, God curse them, they have never helped us one bit.” The harshness of the army’s repression and the protesters’ attack on a local oligarch’s property, both speak to a breakdown of the otherwise prevalent clientelist order.

The lack of movement in the rest of the country may be down to a numbing effect of the crisis. However, given the ever-deteriorating situation for most of Lebanon’s population, more widespread explosions of popular anger and despair appear all but inevitable. Meanwhile, the deepening crisis also means that Lebanon’s sectarian parties will be faced with dwindling resources to shore up their political base. As such, Tripoli might yet prove to be Lebanon’s canary in the coal mine.

A self-inflicted crisis?

Contrary to what the bourgeois media may suggest, the ever-deepening crisis unfolding in Lebanon is not a “self-inflicted crisis.” Such rhetoric is always used to make ordinary people pay for the crisis of capitalism. Instead, this is a crisis inflicted on the people of Lebanon by the Lebanese bourgeoisie and their imperialist backers.

Profiting from a sectarian political system of divide and rule a small elite has been able to enormously enrich itself. A study based on 2005–2014 data found that the top 10% of the population owned 70% of the country’s personal wealth. The top 1% owned 45%. A mere 0,1% of the population was earning as much as the bottom half of the population, making Lebanese income distribution comparable to that in Brazil and South Africa, some of the most unequal societies in the world.

In the years prior to the 2019 financial crisis, ballooning government debt translated into soaring banking profits, enormously benefiting Lebanon’s political elite which was heavily involved in the sector. Just eight families held 29% of the sector’s total assets. When the financial system began to unravel ordinary citizens were left with bank withdrawal limits and no access to foreign currency (dollars) while a small layer of profiteers, in large part politicians and their families, were able to siphon out much of their wealth.

Six Lebanese residents featured in the 2020 Forbes rich list. These include three siblings of the aforementioned Saad Hariri with a combined wealth of $4,4 billion from construction, real estate, and investment, as well as former prime minister Najib Mikati and his brother who had accumulated $4,4 billion from telecommunications.

Lebanon’s elite have left the state weakened and struggling to provide basic services, let alone a viable social safety net. Sectarian leaders and their political parties employ a part of the plundered wealth to maintain assistance networks for their supporters. These may include handouts, jobs and NGOs to assist with everything from travel to education and health needs. In this way people are left both dependent on their corrupt leaders and divided along sectarian lines.

Economic collapse & social devastation

In Lebanon, the economic crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic has compounded an economic crisis that was already well underway. Following a decline of 1.9% in 2018 and 6.7% in 2019, Lebanon’s economy shrank by anywhere between 19% and 25% in 2020.

The crisis has been further compounded by the August 4 Beirut port blast which killed more than 200 people, injured over 6500, and displaced around 300.000. The resulting damage is estimated at 15 billion dollars.

By early 2021 the Lebanese Lira had lost 80% of its value against the dollar on the black market. 2020 saw overall inflation hit 133%. Given Lebanon’s reliance on imports, the price of some products has increased even more dramatically. Food prices, for instance, have increased fourfold.

Due to cuts in state subsidies, bread prices have recently been raised for the fourth time since last June. Two of these rises have come just since the start of 2021. A standard 930 gram loaf of bread a day now costs 11% of the minimum wage. The latter amounts to roughly $80 a month at the black-market exchange rate.

With foreign currency reserves shrinking rapidly government subsidies on wheat, fuel, and medications could end entirely by the end of March. This would cause a further doubling of the price of bread. The anticipated scrapping of import subsidies on medical supplies, 85% of medicines are imported, has already led to hoarding and empty pharmacy shelves.

Owing to inflation, 94% of households are now earning less than the minimum wage, with 29% earning the equivalent of 1.80 dollars a day. Hundreds of thousands have lost their job and unemployment is currently estimated at 35%.

As a result, the poverty rate has close to doubled from 28% in 2019 to 55.3% in 2021. Extreme poverty meanwhile has nearly tripled, now affecting 22% of the population. The poverty rate among Syrian refugees is estimated at 91%. Many households have gone into debt to pay for expenses such as food, rent, or medical care. Amidst this social pressure cooker reports of domestic violence have doubled.

Money sent by relatives working abroad serves as a lifeline to many. Lebanon ranks third in the world in terms of per capita remittances. Due to currency devaluation, remittances account for an ever-greater share of GDP. Yet, amidst the covid-19 recession, in absolute terms remittances actually fell by 6% in 2020.

Besides hunger, Lebanon is also seeing a wave of evictions, particularly among refugees and migrant workers who are not only poorer but more vulnerable. In the areas of Beirut most affected by the blast, rents are being raised after renovations are completed, effectively evicting poorer residents. Meanwhile a large share of Beirut apartments, mostly held as investment by expats or wealthy locals, sit vacant.

The financial crisis which began in the fall of 2019 has ruined wide swaths of the middle class. Being forced to convert their foreign currency deposits into the local currency at half the black-market rate, small and medium-sized depositors have suffered a "de-facto haircut” with substantial losses. The pandemic has finished off many struggling businesses.

An estimated 70% of Lebanese are now thought to require relief. Currently, the government provides food aid to a mere 50,000 families. A world bank loan is supposed to compensate for the imminent end of subsidies assuring that 230,000 of the poorest households (some 800,000 people) receive the equivalent of around 50 dollars a month. This aid is not only inadequate but would only reach a fraction of those in need.

From covid-19 surge to total lockdown

The recorded number of COVID-19 cases remained quite low in Lebanon until late in the summer of 2020. The devastation brought about by the August 4 Beirut port explosion accelerated the spread of the virus. Yet for commercial reasons, the government eased restrictions for the Christmas and New Year holidays. They hoped thousands of visiting Lebanese expats would boost the ailing tourist industry. As a consequence, in January Lebanon recorded one of the world’s steepest per-capita surges in infections. As of February 21, 4340 deaths from COVID-19 have been confirmed in Lebanon, over 60% of these having occurred since the start of the year.

Authorities finally declared a total lockdown for Jan. 14–25. It was subsequently extended. Reportedly one of the strictest in the world, it included a 24-hour curfew and the closure of supermarkets and grocery shops. Daily essentials were only to be available through delivery services at an additional cost of 10 to 15%. For many, especially those working in the informal economy, confinement meant being condemned to starve. However, in some of the most deprived areas of the country the curfew proved largely unenforceable. It was simply impossible to make the destitute pay the fines.

Health system in tatters

With the government owing Lebanon’s already fragmented and commercialized health system an estimated 1.6 billion dollars, the country was left ill-prepared for the latest surge in cases. Additionally, several Beirut hospitals damaged in the blast were unable to take patients or were operating at reduced capacity. As cases peaked, hospital emergency rooms soon reached capacity. Many Covid-19 patients ended up being treated on hospital parking lots, some of them in containers, others receiving oxygen in their cars.

For most refugees and for the Lebanese citizens plunged into poverty access to medical care is in any case very limited. For those unable to find or afford a hospital bed the only option left was to purchase an oxygen cylinder. Meanwhile, hospitals in the poorest rural areas ran out of oxygen altogether. Due to squalid living conditions, refugees are also more affected by the pandemic. According to the UN, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are three times more likely to die with COVID-19 than the population as a whole.

Even more than hospital capacity understaffing left the system critically unprepared. Since late 2019 40% of nurses have been dismissed from public and private hospitals, further overburdening the remaining staff, many of which have fallen ill due to lack of PPE. The payment of salaries, which have already plummeted due to inflation, is often delayed for months. As a result, many of the most qualified staff, including nearly 700 doctors, have chosen to emigrate in 2020. Meanwhile there are many doctors, nurses, and health professionals among Syrian refugees who are prohibited from working in sectors outside of agriculture, construction, and cleaning services.

Vaccine roll-out

The prospect of achieving respite from the sanitary emergency through vaccination appears doubtful. The first COVID-19 vaccine doses were delivered to Lebanon in mid-February. So far, the government has been able to secure enough vaccines to vaccinate less than half of the population. The authorities appear to have decided to leave further imports to the private sector.

Playing the divide and rule game, various prominent politicians have called for refugees, one fifth of the population, to be excluded from the vaccine roll-out. However, it has since been confirmed that both citizens and refugees would be eligible. Nevertheless, very few refugees, either due to a lack of awareness, or a lack of trust in the process, have registered for the vaccine. In a final twist, contradicting pronouncements by the interim health minister, a recent Ministry of Labor statement has declared migrant laborers, 400,000 people, completely ineligible.

Atomization, survival, flight

The hope initially engendered by the October 17 movement managed to briefly reverse the long-standing migratory flow out of the country. Some expats even returned to witness and partake in a movement, which was supposed to change the country’s destiny.

The depth of a crisis can drive the masses out on the streets but can also have a numbing effect. Particularly without the organization and the program to give a movement a sense of direction, individuals can fall back to looking out for their own survival. In the words of Omar Shaar, a 28-year-old programmer and participant in the movement; “Honestly, I’m heartbroken. When we went down to the protests, you felt like everyone was in the same boat. Now it’s like a free-for-all.” Like many who were initially swept up in the movement he is now seeking to emigrate.

For many, the port blast appears to have been the final straw. It not only aggravated the economic crisis but served as a dramatic reminder of all the ills undermining Lebanese society. In late August a former MP reported that 380,000 had made immigration requests at European, US, and Canadian embassies. A recent poll found that four out of five Lebanese aged between 18 and 24 were considering leaving the country. Many holding dual nationality have already left, and many more, mostly young and educated, are seeking to do the same.

At present, emigration on the scale seen during the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) seems unlikely. Obtaining visas and finding a job abroad amidst the corona-recession are obvious obstacles. Moreover, bank withdrawal limits and the currency devaluation are even making buying plane tickets a difficult undertaking. For the poor, in any case, the options are very limited. A new trend of Lebanese nationals joining Syrian and Palestinian refugees on the dangerous boat journey to Cyprus speaks to the growing desperation.

Openings for reaction

Meanwhile growing frustrations and poverty can also lead to tensions between locals and refugees who already face racism and discrimination. Without legal residency and work permits, they are exploited as cheap labor thus competing with impoverished locals. Small disputes can quickly lead to attacks. In late December, a Syrian refugee camp in north Lebanon’s Miniyeh region was set ablaze, causing injuries and forcing its 370 residents to flee. Some were subsequently sheltered by more sympathetic locals. Such attacks are actively encouraged by many local authorities. For instance, harsher lockdown restrictions were imposed on Syrian refugees than on Lebanese citizens, thereby creating the false impression that refugees were more likely to spread the virus.

Furthermore, while the extent to which Tripoli is a hotbed of Sunni jihadism is often exaggerated by various sectarian parties, notably Hezbollah, who need a convenient boogeyman to shore-up their own base of support, this is not something which can be ignored altogether. If the movement arrives at an impasse and the most hard-hit communities are left to struggle on their own, such reactionary currents could get more of a hearing.

A political impasse

Since the start of the financial crisis street protests have succeeded in bringing down two governments: the government of prime minister Saad Hariri in October 2019 and the technocratic government of prime minister Hassan Diab following the Beirut blast.

Yet all the old faces are still in the game today and no senior government officials are likely to face any consequence over the Beirut blast. Diab remains care-taker prime minister, while Saad Hariri, as designated prime minister, is trying to bring together a new government. Negotiations have stalled amidst infighting over cabinet posts among the sectarian parties. Hariri and his Sunni dominated Future Movement seek to set up a new technocratic government beholden to themselves. Meanwhile, President Aoun of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, an ally of the Shia Hezbollah, seeks to achieve veto power through the creation of two additional ministries to be filled by his appointees.

Help from abroad?

All non-humanitarian assistance by the IMF, the US, European states, and Arab countries is being withheld until a new government is formed. These “external partners,” first and foremost France’s president Macron, the main foreign power broker in the negotiations, hypocritically pose as the saviors of Lebanon.

Of course, they are in no way the disinterested friends of Lebanon they claim. Lebanon’s sectarian-based political system is the product of imperial divide and rule. It was designed by French colonialism a century ago when France and Great Britain divided the Middle East amongst themselves, and Lebanon was carved out of Greater Syria. Nowadays, geopolitical rivalries of Western and regional powers still play-out in Lebanon’s political arena. Western powers and the Gulf monarchies favor the “14th of March” alliance around Hariri as a counterweight to the influence of the Shia Hezbollah and Amal, both allies of the Iranian and Syrian regimes. The US has imposed sanctions on Hezbollah and has recently extended these to figures around President Aoun. None of the crocodile tears they shed about “corruption” will ever prevent them from supporting their crooked proxies on the ground. In the end, the “structural reforms” will do little or nothing to infringe on the sectarian status quo or corruption, while ordinary people will face more austerity and privatizations, for example, the electricity sector. Western powers hope to prevent Lebanon from becoming a “failed state” because they fear this could benefit Hezbollah, and by extension Iran. Neither are European powers keen on seeing more refugees crossing the Mediterranean.

While posing as Lebanon’s savior, France has supplied the equipment, ranging from tear gas canisters, pepper sprays to grenade launchers, rubber bullets, and armored vehicles used to suppress protests. Both the UK and the USA are set to supply the Lebanese army with hundreds more vehicles. Supposedly these are intended to defend the border against Daesh and for use in “counter-extremism operations.” Given current developments, it is more likely that this equipment will be used to quell street protests.

Will the warlords return to their old tricks?

The night of 3 February saw the assassination in southern Lebanon of Lokman Slim, a prominent Shiite critic of Hezbollah. The killing has ignited fears of a return of political assassinations, a practice particularly prominent in the period between 2005 and 2013. Many of these were at the time linked to the Syrian regime and Hezbollah. Whatever the merits of the accusations that Slim was too cozy with Western officials, he occupied a void in anti-sectarian opposition politics. As such, this repugnant act undoubtedly reflects Hezbollah’s fear that it is increasingly losing support among the Shiite community. US sanctions, as well as the current crisis, have reportedly undermined Hezbollah’s ability to provide a social safety net for its supporters, let alone for Lebanese Shiites more generally. Moreover, Hezbollah felt threatened enough by the October 17 movement to vigorously organize its supporters against the protests and intimidating participants.

There are concerns that if the economic slide continues state institutions could begin to unravel, and many perfunctory services could all but disappear. In such a scenario, security services would be left to suppress increasing instances of “disorder” and come under growing pressure. With many soldiers already seeing their salaries reduced by inflation to as little as $150 per month, sympathy could grow with those they are charged with policing. This could be an opportunity if the masses get organized and are armed with a revolutionary program. In a scenario where the masses keep resisting in a more haphazard way, however, sectarian political parties, local strongmen, and business tycoons could step into the gap left by state security forces. An early sign of this might be Najib Mikati threatening to “carry arms” in defense of his properties if security forces do not do their job.

However, such a scenario would not mean a return to the days of the civil war. Indeed, although the hope inspired by the October 17 movement may have receded, it has probably lastingly undermined the sectarian ties linking religious communities to their respective sectarian parties. The credibility of the political establishment has been undermined as never before. Despite their conflicts, the sectarian political parties will stick together if their system is threatened by a common enemy. While it is likely that more tensions will arise between the sectarian parties as the economic resources left to plunder diminish, there is a good chance that the violence will be focused on those rebelling against the status quo.

October 17 movement

In so far as the October 17 movement is organized, it is an umbrella of tens of widely differing groups which disagree on many fundamental questions. For example, on how to deal with the economic crisis or the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons. The left is fragmented and has not been able to develop a pole within the movement. In part, this is due to the feebleness of working-class organization in Lebanon, exemplified by the complete absence of the labor unions in the protests.

At least on the student electoral plain, there are some hopeful signs for anti-sectarian politics. In the autumn of 2020 independent non-sectarian lists made unprecedented gains in student council elections, even gaining a majority in some universities. It is unclear if this can be replicated in parliamentary elections for which many voters have to travel to the rural districts of their birth. Here sectarian forces can use all their dirty tricks and may be much harder to dislodge. However, the old sectarian establishment is feeling the pressure, and is in some instances trying to re-style itself as “independent,” a case in point being Hariri’s Future Movement. In this context, it is crucial that forces emerging from the October 17 movement clarify what they really stand for.

More liberal democratic forces within the movement merely seek “a state where justice and the rule of law prevails” and where the state monopolizes the “possession of weapons and guarantees for the rights of its citizens.” Corruption is intrinsic to capitalism and no amount of reforming will alter that. Nor will the rule of law solve the economic crisis or bring relief to the starving masses. The state monopoly on violence certainly is no blessing to the protesters in Tripoli. Unarming right-wing sectarian militias is well and good, but what if these are useful auxiliaries for the bourgeoisie which controls the state? Who is to disarm them?

Up until now, the October 17 movement can claim to have raised the level of political awareness, blocked some anti-social measures, and forced two governments from office. If they can agree on a platform, some leading elements might contest the parliamentary elections in 2022. Can it also help organize relief for the masses?

The way out …

The situation in Lebanon is very pressing and the rotten cabal at the helm has remained unchanged. They can afford to wait it out, most people cannot. They can wait for disillusionment to set in further, eventually the old game of divide and rule will once again have the desired results. They cannot be reformed or pressurized, they must be swept aside and replaced.

Only the working class can bring about the transformation of society so that the system works for all, not just for the very few. To this end, working people must get organized and a revolutionary leadership must be forged.

Amidst the hardships of the crisis, democratically elected committees in workplaces and neighborhoods must be organized in the struggle to assure that people’s basic needs, such as food and healthcare, are met. These organs could also organize the defense against violence by state forces and sectarian militias. Unity in struggle would help overcome the particular oppression of women, refugees, migrant workers, and many others. If linked up nationally these committees could go on to form a revolutionary constituent assembly. This would be a key element in the program and intervention of a revolutionary socialist organization in Lebanon.

A revolutionary constituent assembly could lay the basis to replace the existing sectarian-based political system, to expropriate the plunderers, and set the stage for a democratically planned socialist economy. This would open the door to a new kind of socialist society in Lebanon, the region, and beyond.