This document is one of the resolutions from the 12th World Congress of ISA (formerly the CWI), which took place in January-February 2020. Following a certain delay due to pressing work and interventions into the stormy world situation, it was uploaded to our archive in July 2020, for the benefit of our readers. Documents were agreed on World Relations, Western Europe, Central & Eastern Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and on women’s struggles and socialist feminism.
The world perspectives document for the coming world congress points to the fact that Europe is entering a new period of instability. At this stage, this is most striking on the political plane. The capitalist classes are faced with instability and a loss of control. Many of their authoritative institutions and traditional parties, which had built a strong social base during the postwar boom, have eroded, collapsed or are on the verge of it. This is reflected in elections with many complicated shifts and political fragmentation.
Political crisis
As a result, elections tend to turn into nightmares for the capitalists classes. Nonetheless, they generally prefer to try and deal with the results rather than risk rerunning elections — a strategy that would not necessarily guarantee a more suitable outcome and which could further fuel the already existing democratic deficit. Instead they prefer to improvise and cobble together unstable, contradictory coalitions, even when this requires record long periods between elections and government formations (something seen in Belgium, Netherlands, Northern Ireland and Sweden). When necessary, they stumble on with minority governments, reshuffle existing governments or simply form alternative majorities, as was recently the case in Italy after the populist-right La Lega party broke its coalition with the Five Star movement. In Spain, the political stalemate is such that a 4th election in 4 years’ time has become unavoidable without any guarantee of a more workable outcome.
Currently 8 out of 28 European Union member states are headed by minority governments and a further 4 EU countries, or 5 if Northern Ireland is included, are run by caretaker governments or another interim body. Even the oldest and strongest traditional parties, whether conservative, Christian Democrat or Social Democrat, are facing crisis. In the past, their strength was based on the post-war boom and social spending. But four decades of neo-liberal pro-capitalist politics have eroded their popular support, further accelerated by the austerity ushered in by the financial crash of 2008. This fundamentally undermined the capitalist’s ability to rule in the old way. In the previous period, the most striking feature was the emergence of new left parties. In some countries, part of the vacuum was also filled by parties linked to specific burning issues such as women’s rights, pensioners’ rights, animal rights and corruption, others based more generally on reinvigorated national questions or the environment. In the latter period the most striking, and for the overall majority of capitalists the most worrying feature, has been the emergence of and electoral gains of right-populist and far-right forces on the one hand and the emergent new left formations on the other.
The capitalists don’t easily desert their traditional political instruments, but some became so weakened that they were forced to rely on politicians and formations who they previously would have kept at a distance. Italy is an extreme example with first Berlusconi, then a government of technocrats, the failure of Renzi and subsequently the Five Star movement and La Lega. Ciudadanos, the N-VA (Flanders), the SNP and Syriza also point in that direction. The capitalist establishment hoped that Macron in France would become a new model. But since his election, he has been confronted with strikes, demonstrations, the Gilets Jaunes and now he faces a pension revolt. In the European elections in May 2019 his party came second behind the extreme right Rassemblement National!
In Central and Eastern Europe, where consciousness is even more colored by the experience of Stalinism and its collapse, as well as by the disappointment of the semi-colonial relationship within the European Union, populist forces tend to fill the space. They exploit disappointment, are generally very right wing and they try to base themselves on the domestic ruling elite, especially in Poland and Hungary. The European elite cannot but tolerate and try to mollify them. This is outlined fully in our resolution on Eastern Europe.
Roots of racism and the far right
While racism has always been an important ingredient in the divide-and-rule policy of the capitalist classes, when the extreme right first started to attract electoral support, the capitalists kept them at a distance and condemned them on moral grounds. At the same time social destruction, the main recruitment ground for the far right, has continued. Over time capitalist politicians ‘recognized’ the extreme right were identifying ‘real existing problems while giving the wrong answers’ and its voters ‘had to be taken into account’. Then they started to adopt the racist policies of the extreme right to ‘take the wind out of their sails’. It only made key parts of the extreme right’s program more mainstream and normalized those parties. Traditional parties started to rely on their support at first as a prop from outside but now also through direct government participation, as had happened earlier in Austria.
Decades of neoliberalism have created a whole layer of people who now feel represented by no-one, not even the unions whose policies mainly consist of (insufficiently) defending the existing workforce as opposed to the new generation of workers who have worse contracts and lower pay. Meanwhile, we’ve seen shrinking social benefits and ever-growing waiting lists increase competition for fewer jobs, fewer affordable houses, fewer services and fewer social benefits. When this situation is combined with the anti-establishment rhetoric, Euroscepticism and hardline anti-immigration policies of the far right, and in the absence of an answer from the left on those issues, the extreme right has been able to succeed in consolidating a social base in a whole range of countries. While their support is mainly on the electoral plane, this in turn strengthens the confidence of a more militant far right/neo-fascist core. This is happening in Scandinavia, Germany, France, Italy and now also in Spain. These forces can be thrown back temporarily because of internal divisions between the more populist wing and those who are attracted to power-sharing, by their involvement in numerous scandals, or because other right-wing parties seem to offer more direct solutions. But even where far right parties have participated in government or been riddled by scandals, it doesn’t automatically or immediately mean they suffer electoral defeats or cannot retain an important base.
The new left formations
To push them back more permanently it will not only require a credible socialist answer but also an upsurge in class struggle and other concrete struggles. Even then, the far-right can reemerge, especially when the economic crisis hits and on the back of refugees if the scandalous deals with the Turkish and other regimes were to collapse. Meanwhile the new left formations that have developed in the context of this vacuum, while we in no way underestimate their still-existing potential, now face serious difficulties. Some key “weaknesses” they share, to varying degrees, help in explaining this. Their reformist character, social composition, passive membership, lack of internal democratic structures, electoralism and tendency toward forming coalitions — all these are of course manifestations of their reformist character and weak roots in the working class. Their approach is also generally decoupled from a fighting program and active mobilization. Most of them have already proved themselves unable to fully face up to the historic tasks posed by this period. Despite all their weaknesses, the broader left parties have been a factor in diminishing or delaying the development of right-wing populist parties in some countries. For example, Die Linke was not able to prevent the rise of the AfD but was an important factor in delaying the process.
The case of Syriza, whose abject capitulation created the conditions for the right-wing New Democracy party to return to power in Greece, should stand as a stark warning of the consequences of such failures. After the local elections in 2015, Podemos could have built a front of rebellious cities to break the austerity straitjacket and mobilize millions. That would have put them in a position to challenge Sanchez today over a social emergency plan, discussed in general assemblies involving social movements, left parties and the unions all over Spain. As it stands now, with Unidas Podemos (UP) having joined a PSOE-led coalition, there is a real danger of UP being complicit in austerity measures, which Sanchez is likely to push for if the current slowdown of the economy worsens. While many workers and youth have welcomed this coalition as a way to stop the right from returning to government, we must point out the risk of UP’s potential complicity in neoliberal measures aiding Vox, allowing them to falsely pose as the anti-establishment alternative. The best way to avoid that is for trade unions, social movements and the left (including UP’s rank and file) to mobilise against any such measures.
Mélenchon and La France Insoumise failed to utilise the impressive mobilizations during and after the presidential elections to build solid and active rank-and-file structures. Die Linke, the Dutch Socialist Party and the Swedish Left Party all participated in austerity coalitions on a local and a regional level. With PCP and Left Bloc support from outside and without active mobilization against its most anti-worker policies, the ‘contraption’ government in Portugal paved the way for an electoral victory of the social democratic ‘Socialist Party’.
There are doubtless a number of specific factors which help explain the emergence of the Corbyn phenomenon within Labour in Britain. It led to a situation of two parties in one, locked in a civil war tragically fought mostly from one side, with the other systematically restraining Corbyn and leading to a certain loss of momentum. In general, the Corbyn phenomenon is not the kind of return to prominence the leadership of the social democratic parties were hoping for. But it didn’t stop the German SPD from trying and failing at a bad imitation with Martin Schultz. Since then, two other ‘models’ have emerged. Portuguese SP Prime Minister Antonio Costa managed to silence his left competitors in exchange for some concessions based on a slightly better economic situation, while continuing general austerity and attacks on workers’ rights. It is very unlikely Costa will continue to generate electoral support once the economic situation deteriorates. Danish social democrat Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen won the June elections this year on the basis of a very hard immigration policy combined with opposition to increasing the pension age and cuts in social welfare. Further deterioration of the economy will probably make her drop the second part, while the first part of her policy will only pave the way for the electoral resurgence of the populist right Danish People’s Party.
This is a contradictory process. While the French unions have failed to answer the attacks of the ruling class over the years, one year of resistance of “gilets jaunes” and the brutality of Macron’s attacks on the pension schemes forced them to turn to struggle again. While the outcome is still open and betrayal always a possibility, recent events mark a certain revival of the French union movement. Since Germany is the “winner country” of the European crisis, the big industrial unions compromised with the employers over years, spreading economically nationalist ideas amongst the workers. But at the same time new layers of the working class, like nurses and childcare workers and also workers in the transport and delivery sectors, have gone into struggle in Germany. During these struggles the unions grew, but after some half-defeats many left the unions again. While overall we can speak of the unions being on the defensive or being weakened, and while no new permanent combative layer has developed, the situation is still fluid and the union leaderships can’t sabotage all efforts by workers to fight back. We will see movements outside of the traditional unions, but we’ll also see examples of workers turning again to the unions we might have thought they’d given up.
Trade unions and the working class
Decades of neoliberalism, combined with the ideological confusion following the collapse of Stalinism and the subsequent austerity packages, have undermined the unions. Union leaderships, with their reformist outlook, have generally followed a policy of damage control leading to social partnerships, token actions, and negotiated social retreats. In a number of countries union leaders have repeatedly sold out workers’ struggles, and have thus played an important role in the implementation of privatization schemes and austerity policies. Union structures have emptied out and, with a few exceptions, unionization has decreased. In particular, the layer of combative militant activists capable of pressuring or sometimes bypassing the leadership, has shrunk. As a result bureaucratization has increased at the expense of internal democracy. This was further affected by closures and restructuring in heavy industry, the traditional stronghold of the unions. Because the union leaderships often traded off worse conditions for newly employed workers in order to safeguard those of the existing workforce, many young workers didn’t see the point in being unionized let alone becoming union activists. Together with anti-union and anti-strike legislation and the division of workforces through the use of subcontracting and the introduction of different types of contracts in the same workplaces, all this has undermined the belief in the working class as a motor for change.
Any idea, however progressive, can be twisted and turned into its opposite, especially when participation in the struggle to obtain it recedes; workers’ attention is reduced and the program becomes secondary in the minds of those enjoying the fruits of struggle. In order for a struggle to be won, it needs to spread to new layers and its program needs to be developed accordingly. The trade union bureaucracies, however, use general actions, demos and strikes, in the opposite way—as a means to blur the concrete demands, to let off steam or simply to exhaust the movement. The most striking example of this was the incredible number of general strikes in Greece (in the region of 40) in the struggle against the troika. Struggles in a specific workplace or in a specific branch usually develop over more immediate issues, with more concrete aims, higher attention and more active participation. As a result they can take on a more productive and radical character. But in all circumstances it is important to involve as many participants as possible through general assemblies, demonstrations of militants and activists, and campaigns aimed toward the broader public. What stage the struggle is at needs to be discussed, as well as the next steps to be taken and the program required to measure up to the challenge. The general weakening of organization and resulting lack of experience often imposes on us the need to build rank and file structures and work around union bureaucracies as part of what we describe as our double task, building the broader working class movement as well as our own revolutionary parties simultaneously.
While immediate economic issues are extremely important, the conditions of the working class, in all its diversity, are determined by the general situation in society. The environment, women’s rights, LGBTQI+ rights, climate, corruption, inequality, racism and national oppression all have an impact on workers and their families, either directly or indirectly. In order for the working class to obtain maximum unity, it is important to stand up against specific forms of oppression, develop a program to counter them, and to integrate this into a general program for socialist change. However, the union leaders and the left parties either have an economist approach — at best showing solidarity with movements they don’t consider theirs, without challenging the bourgeois or petty bourgeois leaders of the aforementioned movements. Alternatively, they tend to just subordinate themselves to and even take on the political positions of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois leaders, the results of which are disastrous. While we must fight within the working class and the unions to take up issues of specific oppression seriously, we also have to intervene in those movements to orient them toward the working class and the unions.
It is a myth that the industrial, unionized working class is generally the first to act. There was an element of that during the postwar boom, when confidence was high and the level of consciousness about the working class and the possibility of socialist change was more developed than today. But generally the first layers to act are the most oppressed, as well as fresh layers, who are often still unorganized and less tainted by past defeats. While the whole working class suffers under austerity, the specially oppressed layers are hit even harder. Basic objective needs force them into action, but in order to win more than temporary concessions, they need to be joined and actually led by the most powerful and best organized sectors of the working class. The whole working class also suffers from attacks on democratic rights, but specially oppressed layers are again hit harder with their democratic rights being removed, transformed or put in question, especially by the populist right. For us it is crucial to intervene amongst the most oppressed and fresh layers, while at the same time systematically searching for and developing inroads into the industrial working class.
While political representatives of the establishment pretend to stand for equality, the objectification of women is increasing alongside cuts in public spending on, for example, women’s shelters and cuts in health and education that increase the unpaid labour women are forced to do. Meanwhile in several countries, new restrictions are being placed on abortion rights. Together with the general social deterioration, this has led to unprecedented feminist mobilizations from Poland to the US, Brazil and India. In Europe, it has led to the magnificent victory for abortion rights in Ireland and massive demos and strikes in Spain, Italy and many other countries, including Turkey. At the same time, right-wing politicians misuse the rights of women and LGBTQI+ people as so-called ‘western values’ in order to launch racist attacks against immigrants and fuel Islamophobia—as if women, LGBTQI+ people and the working class as a whole had obtained these and other rights without struggle.
Youth and parties
The failure and often open betrayal of the left parties and the trade union leaders in a context of growing inequality and continual attacks on conditions and rights has led to the development of movements specifically suspicious of parties and of organization in general. Elements of this were present in the occupation movements in Greece and the Indignados in Spain. It is also a strong element in the development of the Gilets Jaunes in France, which started after the unions led the magnificent railway strike of May-June 2018 to defeat. Aspects of that feeling were also present in movements against corruption in Romania, Bulgaria and even in the colour revolutions in Ukraine (2003) and Georgia (2004). It is again strongly present, actually dominant, in the movement in Hong Kong. It expresses the objective need to act, reflects the blossoming of ideas to overcome barriers imposed by the state and the unwillingness of the official leaders of the unions and the opposition parties to act in a way that corresponds to the challenges. It is no coincidence that ‘be water’ (the tactical backbone of part of the movement in Hong Kong) and other aspects of the HK movement are now embraced by the mass movements in Catalonia and Chile, as they will be elsewhere.
These characteristics reflect disillusionment in the existing official leaders of the unions and opposition parties and also a degree of impatience among the youth and a lack of understanding of the necessary backbone that needs to be provided by the organized workers’ movement. It is a recurring phase that was also present in the anti-globalisation movements and even further back in the processes of the Russian and Spanish revolutions in the first part of the previous century. It might be longer lasting today because of the extended period of confusion, but can quickly dissipate as soon as its limits are exposed and a force stands up that gives the impression of translating its demands politically, as was the case with Syriza and Podemos at a certain stage. This is now strongly reflected in the process of re-unionization in the US and calls made by Sanders directly referring to the working class. It can and will however also be exploited by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forces or populist politicians, who claim the era of ideologies is over; that they are ‘neither right nor left’ or that they represent a new type of politics reflecting the aspirations of the ‘people’ or that by being successful businessmen, they will also be successful politicians.
The student movement to stop climate change has reached its climax in some countries, e.g. in Germany. It’s not possible that weekly school strikes will go on indefinitely. In some countries there might still be potential for the movement to grow. In others there will be elements of crisis in the movement, while at the same time more political questions will come up and a radicalization will take place. The climate issue won’t vanish, but there will be ups and downs in the movement. A process of differentiation in the youth movement is likely, with parts going towards more “direct action”, others towards questioning capitalism more and still others in the direction of official politics, which could partly be channeled through the Green parties. While the overall aim to change the whole world to stop climate change may look impossible, more concrete issues will come up. This could strengthen petty-bourgeois ideas of limiting consumption and blaming consumers, which would complicate the debate. But there is also potential for more concrete struggles for public transport etc. More and more political and economic questions will be linked to the climate question, like the coming waves of refugees. The crisis of the capitalist car industry will also be linked to this question, with the companies and their political stooges arguing that the climate movement will be responsible for jobs being lost. Divide and rule will be an issue. The task of Marxists in the climate movement is threefold: first, develop a program as concrete as possible to stop the divide and rule tactics, to give facts and figures for how the economy can be changed under the control of the working class and democratically planned into an eco-friendly economy; second, generally explain the need to overthrow capitalism and be the most radical part of the climate movement, giving the vague slogan “system change” a real meaning by fighting for a socialist alternative; third, to take up and give guidance whenever concrete struggles are possible and combine the climate question with basic social demands (like free public transport).
Youth are generally more open to new ideas and less restrained about turning them into action. A general frustration over the lack of perspectives, inequality and worsening conditions has found its way first among them, reflecting more explicitly a feeling starting to sink in among broader layers of adults. In the youth this has developed up to the point where any incident, from the election of Trump, to a rape case, or a suicide by immolation can serve as a catalyst for action. Already, mainly female youth were the driving force in the recently developed feminist wave. The pressing urgency to act on climate broke the floodgates. The combustible material was there, it only needed the spark provided by a young female teenager to unleash a spontaneous, internationalist and partly anti-capitalist (although not necessarily in a conscious way) explosion of resistance. Of course, while adopting some very progressive, typically working-class methods of action, the movement did not start from a preconceived program, nor a clear idea on how to structure itself.
Unsurprisingly this will be exploited by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forces, also ruling parties, to try to guide it into safe channels — including by targeting the inexperienced initiators. They will also try to derail the movement towards individual responsibilities and more supposedly environmentally friendly taxation, and other pseudo-solutions. The whole situation has so far delivered electoral gains for the bourgeois green parties. However, this movement can and already has illustrated that it is learning quickly. In an opinion poll in Belgium, 75% of young respondents expressed the view that planning is a necessity to counter environmental destruction. There is a real strong potential for the development of a robust anti-capitalist trend. This movement, including in the various forms it could possibly take on in the future, could not only re-invigorate exhausted activists, it could also energize the working class; and soon those youth will enter the universities and workplaces. While we must be aware of its weaknesses, we cannot afford to be blinded by those and miss the enormous potential the environmental movement represents to develop struggles and build our forces. We need to be taking bold initiatives, preparing our members politically and trying to play a leading role in organizing the anti-capitalist layers within this movement, so that we can orient it toward class politics, the struggle against capitalism and show how to actually win the fight.
The economy
No doubt the capitalists are aware of the looming social hurricanes. As is said above, they will have to confront this with seriously weakened institutions and political representatives without authority. They can’t rely on the economy to save them. Growth in the European Union is projected to be a meagre 1.6% this year and the following year — 1.4% for both years in the Eurozone. Italy and, even more importantly, Germany will face a near halt in growth. Only Eastern Europe and some countries still recuperating from the previous blows in 2008–2009 and then during the double dip in 2011–2012 are projected to have a slightly higher growth rate. However, this is not only before the announced recession has fully set in, but also fails to take into account a whole host of other issues: a possible acceleration of the trade war, the possible consequences of Brexit, the serious debt problems in a number of developing countries and the possibility of military conflict in the Middle East, which under certain circumstances could drive up oil and other energy prices to record highs.
As is explained in the world perspectives document, representatives of the ruling class now criticize capitalism’s exclusive focus on short-term shareholders’ return. This reflects their fear of public anger over mounting inequality. But in practice neoliberal policies, while partially checked, will continue as no capitalist can afford to lose out in competition, whether individually or as part of a national capitalist class. A fundamental shift in policy will require revolutionary class struggle. Until then, the system will be kept afloat by injecting more liquidity into the markets, while continuing further attacks on wages and services. Already, the ECB has depleted the number of ‘weapons in its armory’. Nevertheless, it further reduced its deposit rate to -0.5% after a nine month break and was forced to relaunch its program of buying bonds. Meanwhile, according to Larry Summers, former secretary of US-treasury, Europe is already stuck in a monetary black hole.
No wonder this provoked serious divisions within the ECB and the EU. The European Union is not one historical entity with one national bourgeoisie, one monetary, fiscal, social and political policy, and a central bank guaranteeing economic stability as well as price stability. It is foremost a common market within which a currency union of 17 operates. It reflects the need to collaborate in competition with other trade blocs, and also the increasing international division of labor. The 17 use the advantages of a common market and currency, even at the expense of some sovereignty, but they are not prepared to carry each other’s burdens. Attempts to arrive at one common military policy are undermined by other imperialist powers (China, US, Russia) playing off differences in interests between the 28 EU countries, as well as by inter-imperialist rivalries within the 28. Strict norms of convergence impose automatic austerity while the currency union excludes competitive devaluations and demands ‘internal devaluation’. Instead of convergence, the ECB’s pre-2008 policies led to productive investments in Germany while cheap credit produced unproductive bubbles in poorer European countries. This underlying weakness transformed the 2008 financial crisis into a debt crisis threatening the unity of Europe and the currency union, as expressed by the debt crisis in Greece.
While the combined efforts of the ECB and the Commission saved the Eurozone from total collapse and kept the European economy floating, nothing has been solved. Even inflation is not picking up and will be limited to 1.2% this year and further decrease to 1% in 2020. There are two related reasons for that. Firstly, because of the uneven distribution of wealth, inflation translates into asset inflation while the rest of the economy is stuck in a deflationary trend. Secondly, this is further stimulated by “internal devaluation”, the flexibilization of labor and reduced labor costs, which tend to limit wage increases. On top of that, official figures (8%) underestimate real unemployment (15.9%) by half. Leaving Germany aside, average public debt-to-GDP in the Eurozone increased from 70% in 2008 to 95% at the end of 2018. A growing number of commentators, including Draghi and Lagarde, argue for surplus states to spend more and help relaunch the economy. At this stage the German ruling class still mainly holds onto its policy of the ‘black zero’. But more and more recognize the dire state of public infrastructure, lower productivity growth, stagnation in investment and continuing to fall behind in terms of innovation, with German technology based on diesel motors being overtaken. With considerable growth of world trade practically excluded, the model of growth based on export is severely limited. This will lead to further demands for state intervention.
Brexit and the EU
Looming over the whole continent like a dark cloud is the scheduled departure of the European Union’s second biggest economy, Britain, and especially the threat of a so-called no-deal Brexit. The crisis that was ushered in as a result of the 2016 vote to leave the EU — itself a confused expression of mass anger at the capitalist establishment and austerity policies — has now seen off two Tory prime ministers. Since 2016, far from the capitalist class being able to regain control over the situation, it has instead spiraled further and further towards chaos. The British capitalists are now left without any viable political vehicle which will reliably act in their interests. The Tory party, the oldest capitalist party in the world, is faced with the worst internal crisis in its history — with many mainstream capitalist Tory MPs expelled from the party or leaving voluntarily — at the same time as Corbyn has been elected to the leadership of the Labour Party.
The emergence of Boris Johnson, a maverick right-populist figure who has won support based on his self-presentation as a determined hard Brexiteer, is itself a reflection of the objective pressures generated by the crisis of capitalism. Specifically, it reflects their difficulty creating a reliable social base for more ‘mainstream’ pro-capitalist politics. Johnson’s short time as prime minister has been marked by a continued and escalating crisis, with the capitalist class attempting to use the parliamentary Remain majority, combined with the judiciary — whose astonishing supreme court ruling against the government forced parliament to reopen — in a last ditch attempt to prevent a no-deal Brexit.
This has resulted in Johnson being forced to request an extension to article 50 and the EU agreeing to extend the deadline for Britain’s departure once again, with 31 January the new supposed Brexit day. What’s more, despite Johnson’s tough talk, he has now negotiated a Brexit deal with the EU which is based on major retreats from his supposed red lines. This includes on the question of the Irish border, with Johnson essentially agreeing to customs checks in the Irish sea — a form of East-West border, something which if implemented would potentially inflame sectarian tensions.
In doing so, Johnson is treading a fine line. Any appearance that he is softening his stance on Brexit leaves him vulnerable to the real danger that the right-populist Brexit party substantially eats into the Tories’ electoral base at a general election.
The Brexit extension has now led to Corbyn backing a general election on 12 December — the outcome of which remains deeply uncertain. This is a serious gamble for Johnson. One thing is clear, however: there is little hope for the capitalists of a parliament being returned which will better represent their interests. In fact, the two most likely outcomes of a December election would be either a strengthening of right-populist forces around Johnson and possibly the Brexit party, or the coming to power of Jeremy Corbyn — something only likely on the basis of him waging a bold, pro-working class, anti-austerity campaign. Such an outcome remains possible and Corbyn’s initial pledges point in a positive direction, though his lengthy dithering on the question of a general election and the lack of clarity in his position on Brexit means Johnson will go into this campaign with a substantial poll lead. While opposing any Tory Brexit, we call on Corbyn to adopt an independent, working-class approach to the question — making his red line a refusal to sign up to any neoliberal and anti-worker treaties or agreements in order to remain in the Single Market and Customs union, and posing a socialist alternative to the EU bosses’ club: a workers’ Europe. Failure on the part of Corbyn to put the class issues center stage would likely result in him losing the election and being forced from the leadership as a result. A Corbyn-led government would itself face immediate and serious tests, with enormous political and economic pressure applied on him to capitulate. Only on the basis of the mass mobilization of the working class and preparedness to take socialist measures could such pressures be ultimately avoided, but Corbyn has not given signs that he could move in this direction.
The great recession brought the European Union to the brink of partial collapse. If anything, these centrifugal forces, which never receded completely, could be coming back to the fore if an all-sided crisis were to hit the EU and the Eurozone. Then the issue of a partial break-up of the Euro could come back on the agenda. The threat of Brexit and its consequences certainly cooled off Euroscepticism and temporarily lessened the centrifugal forces within the European Union. But they could be reinvigorated at some point, for example through the rise of the far right in a number of countries, through a new recession that will put countries like Italy with high debt under immense pressure, or especially if the scandalous deal with Turkey to keep refugees within its borders were to collapse. That deal is a dangerous weapon in the hands of Erdogan. It underlines the hypocrisy of the European ruling classes, the weakness of the left and could, if Turkey were to release the refugees, further spur nationalist and racist forces in Europe.
National Questions
The centrifugal forces operate not only within the European Union, but also within its member states. The brutal handling of the Catalan national question by the Spanish state could easily spiral out of control. The severe sentences over a democratic issue have propelled the national question again to the front, but with the Catalan bourgeois forces further weakened this time. Neither the Spanish left, nor the leaderships of the main trade unions have proved themselves capable of developing a program that unites the working class. At best, they hide behind the legal system which was inherited from the transition regime of ’78, which still carries many aspects of the Franco era. The Catalan left on the other hand has a stageist approach, decoupling the need for socialism from the fight for Catalan independence. This essentially results in their support for nationalist forces from the right, including their austerity budgets. Only full recognition of Catalan workers’ and youth’s right to an independent socialist Catalan republic of workers and youth, to be unified in a voluntary socialist confederation of all peoples and nations living in Spain, could ultimately forge the working-class unity necessary to remove the oppressive Spanish state and end all forms of oppression and exploitation.
The national question is always concrete. There are no demands that can be transposed from country to country without taking into consideration the living forces on the ground. Similarly, there exist no demands that have eternal validity as conditions change. There is only a common method and approach based on the crucial necessity of workers’ unity. That is why we do not support demands that would lead to greater division of the working class, such as a border poll in Ireland or the splitting of social security in Belgium. But we do defend democratic national demands as a necessary condition for obtaining the voluntary unity of the working class. Brexit will certainly strengthen the aspirations for Scottish independence. It would be a major mistake to deny this right. But, at the same time, it is necessary to expose the reactionary character of the European Union and argue for workers’ unity and socialism. Further national questions will resurface with vigor, especially when a new recession hits. No workers’ organisation will be able to withstand the pressure and survive without a sensitive, detailed and clear program for working-class unity and socialism.
In the next period, Europe will become the scene of mass upheaval, mainly among the youth, reflecting deeper sentiments which have not yet fully come to the surface but which are definitely burgeoning among working-class families. The movement will not develop in a straight line. There will be breaks, temporary setbacks and confusion. There will certainly be class polarization. At moments, reaction will be strengthened. But the general curve will be towards an upsurge in class struggle with, especially among young people, enormous possibilities to build our forces.
