Defend Cuba through mass struggle, international solidarity, and the fight for socialism with workers’ democracy!
In recent weeks, the risk of some form of U.S. military intervention in Cuba has increased considerably. In addition to imposing a series of new sanctions and an energy blockade since January, aimed at suffocating the country and causing terrible humanitarian consequences, the U.S. has also mobilized a strong military presence around the Caribbean island. The threat is real, even if the immediate goal is mainly to intimidate the Cuban regime and extract further concessions, beyond those the regime is already offering.
It is true that many of the political, economic, social, and even symbolic achievements of the 1959 revolution have been eroded in recent years. However, it is also true that an imperialist attack on Cuba would have terrible consequences for its people and must be confronted, both on and off the island, armed with the revolutionary and socialist spirit that has shaped the history of this country.
As part of this escalation of aggression and intimidation, the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz has been deployed to the Caribbean along with destroyers and missile cruisers capable of striking land targets. Drones and surveillance aircraft also frequently fly over Cuba. The amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge and its escorts, which can transport about 2,500 Marines, are also on standby off the coast of Virginia, as are fighter jets in Florida and Puerto Rico.
As he turns 95, Raúl Castro has become the latest pretext used by U.S. imperialism as a potential justification for military intervention in Cuba. The deployment of the USS Nimitz coincided with the decision by the U.S. Department of Justice to file formal charges against the former Cuban president, making him a fugitive from U.S. justice, for his alleged authorization of an attack on a civilian aircraft carrying U.S. citizens.
The incident in question, which occurred in 1996, was nothing more than a provocation by a section of the Cuban far right in exile. They promoted the invasion of Cuban airspace with the aim of creating a political incident that would disrupt then-President Clinton’s intentions to ease the economic embargo against Cuba, which aimed to allow foreign private investment on the island to undermine the revolution’s achievements from within. With the crisis generated by this episode, Clinton changed his stance and the economic blockade on the island remained in place.
About 20 years later, a new attempt to adopt a less belligerent (though still imperialist) strategy was initiated by Obama, who partially reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba and even visited the island in 2016, amid pro-market reforms promoted by then-President Raúl Castro. But this was short-lived. When Trump took office in 2017, the stance of U.S. imperialism soon returned to one of greater belligerence.
In his second term, Trump adopted an even more aggressive stance against potential enemies and threats in Latin America. Within the framework of the inter-imperialist conflict with China, the U.S. government intensified its quest for control over the Western Hemisphere and, in particular, what it considers its Latin American “backyard,” under the terms of the “Monroe Doctrine” updated and applied by Donald Trump.
The military intervention in Venezuela on January 3 kidnapped the country’s president, allowed the U.S. to gain control over Venezuela’s oil and other resources, and established Washington’s tutelage over the current government led by Delcy Rodríguez. This victory for imperialism ultimately fueled even greater arrogance and aggression on Trump’s part, both within the region and beyond.
Whether under the false pretext of combating what he calls “narco-terrorism,” or using directly ideological, political, and economic arguments, Trump has been undermining the national sovereignty of various Latin American countries and explicitly acting in support of his far-right allies in the region.
The excessive self-confidence of U.S. imperialism after January 3, however, has also revealed its fragility. The fallout from the war Trump launched against Iran has ultimately placed his administration in an extremely difficult situation both domestically and internationally. A fiasco in Iran, as we are seeing, weakens Trump on the eve of the U.S. midterm elections and also on the international stage.
In this context, securing a victory against Cuba could serve as symbolic compensation for the failure in Iran and divert attention from that international embarrassment. Military aggression against Cuba, whatever its scale, beyond the offensive already underway, is therefore a real danger and demands the attention, mobilization, and rejection of the entire movement of workers and oppressed peoples in Latin America and around the world.
An Easy Operation?
However, things may not be so easy for Trump, even when dealing with a small island located just 90 miles (150 kilometers) from the U.S. For 67 years, this same island and its people have been resisting imperialist aggression. The risk of a new fiasco, following the one experienced with Iran, must be carefully calculated, as it could end up being disastrous for Trump. In this context a ground invasion, for example, would be extremely risky and unlikely.
Even so, Trump’s Secretary of War, Peter Hegseth, continues to repeat—as he did recently during his visit to Guantánamo—that “all options are on the table” and that Trump will decide Cuba’s future. It is possible to imagine that Trump, Rubio, and Hegseth have in mind to repeat in Raúl Castro and Miguel Díaz-Canel’s Cuba what they did in Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela.
After imposing an economic stranglehold on the country and its people, they hope a limited military intervention could be carried out—with minimal U.S casualties—to decapitate the government and force the submission of a new leader who would collaborate in implementing pro-capitalist and pro-U.S. reforms while simultaneously suppressing any expression of popular discontent.
However, the situation in Cuba is not the same as in Venezuela, and the timing is different as well. Although it prefers to negotiate an agreement and even make concessions, the Cuban regime knows that this may not be enough to prevent an attack, just as it was not in Venezuela. The Cuban regime does not underestimate the possibility of an attack—it is trying to prepare for this situation and has more experience dealing with this type of threat. Despite the precariousness of the situation in Cuba, its evident military and technological inferiority, and even the regime’s erosion, the potential for resistance on the island cannot be compared to what occurred in Venezuela in January.
Furthermore, even in Venezuela itself, the situation is far from being consolidated or sustainable in the medium or long term. Of course, Trump managed to co-opt Maduro’s regime and impose a form of tutelage over the country, but how long will this last? Frustration with the results of the counter-reforms favoring the U.S. and big private capital in Venezuela is tending to grow, and the strong tradition of struggle and resistance among the Venezuelan people will emerge once again. In this scenario of dissatisfaction and resistance against the U.S. and Delcy Rodríguez’s capitulation, new alternatives will emerge, along with new crises and divisions at the top of the government.
Regime Concessions
With regard to Cuba, at this moment, the main objective of the energy blockade, the sanctions against the island, and the military mobilization in the Caribbean is to intimidate and force the regime to make concessions. New sanctions and measures against companies operating in Cuba or Cuban authorities continue to be imposed. The most recent is the freezing of financial assets belonging to the Cuban state-owned oil company CUPET, shortly after the announcement of the freezing of bank accounts belonging to Díaz-Canel and other officials.
More drastic measures of intimidation, including military ones, could be taken at any moment. But even amid the escalation of sanctions and threats, talks between the Cuban regime and U.S. officials have been taking place.
One of the main negotiators on the Cuban side, albeit in a more discreet manner, is Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, grandson of Raúl Castro. He holds a view that is as open—if not more so—to pro-market, pro-capitalist policies than his grandfather, who was the one who kicked off reforms of this nature in earnest when he was president of Cuba. Furthermore, he wields influence over the Cuban military apparatus, including GAESA, the business conglomerate controlled by the armed forces that controls 40% of the Cuban economy.
Since President Miguel Díaz-Canel publicly acknowledged that negotiations were underway, several contacts between officials from the two governments have taken place in public. In May, CIA Director John Ratcliffe was in Havana for meetings with Cuban security officials, as well as Raúl Rodriguez Castro. Shortly thereafter, the head of U.S. Southern Command, General Francis Donovan, met in Guantánamo with the Chief of Staff of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, General Roberto Legrá Sotolongo.
The Cuban regime frequently speaks of resistance against an invasion, as in the case of the distribution to the population of the booklet “Family Guide for Protection Against Military Aggression.” At the same time, it is betting on negotiations by offering concessions to big imperialist capital and the U.S. government.
Private investments by Cubans in exile, of any size and including productive sectors, infrastructure, and even banking and finance, are now permitted on the island. At the same time, state-guaranteed food distribution has been severely restricted, and Cubans now have to buy basic foodstuffs at high prices just as the social crisis deepens.
Despite the pro-market measures, several European and other companies, including Spanish hotels, German shipping companies, and Canadian mining firms, for example, have been leaving Cuba in recent weeks. This reflects U.S. sanctions, but also the country’s economic collapse caused by the blockade.
Power outages in various regions of the country are long and frequent, with some instances of a complete collapse in the electricity supply. In addition to the inability to store food—when it can be obtained—water pumping itself depends on electricity and is affected by the blackouts. Public transportation is severely impacted. Public health, one of the great achievements of the revolution, has been hit hard. There is a shortage of medicines, and in hospitals, official figures show more than 96,000 Cubans currently awaiting general surgery. This surgical waiting list could swell to 160,000 patients by the end of the year.
The humanitarian aid arriving from some countries is important, but it is far from sufficient given the gravity of the situation. The only time the oil embargo was eased was in April, when a Russian ship carrying 100,000 tons of oil (about 700,000 barrels) was authorized by the U.S. to unload in Cuba. But the relief was short-lived and did not even cover 1/8 of the country’s monthly demand.
At the same time, even though there is a high degree of unpredictability and irrationality in Trump’s stance, U.S. officials know that the consequences of a social, economic, and political collapse in Cuba would give rise to all kinds of instability and chaos. This would impact not only the island, but also have repercussions for the U.S. as well, including issues such as an even greater migration surge and enormous political and social instability. For this reason, they fear losing control of the situation and prefer a more controlled transition, as they are attempting to do in Venezuela. But this is a difficult goal to achieve.
Internal social dissatisfaction in Cuba is expressed through countless pot-banging protests in neighborhoods and even some larger demonstrations. The government, for its part, seeks to celebrate the symbols of Cuba’s revolutionary past, including references to the centenary of Fidel Castro, and large official public rallies, even though the current Díaz-Canel government’s ties to that anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist past are growing weaker by the day.
Outside of Cuba, the actions of governments considered “progressive” in Latin America in the face of threats and attacks against the island are extremely timid, often going no further than limited rhetoric. None of them dared to break the oil blockade imposed by Trump, limiting themselves at most to occasional humanitarian aid. Much of the leadership of the unions, social movements, and the left—often linked to these governments—has been unable to translate their rhetoric condemning Trump’s attacks into robust mobilization efforts.
The greatest possible unity must be sought for actions in solidarity with the Cuban people and in condemnation of U.S. imperialism. At the same time, it is crucial to build a left-wing, socialist, and revolutionary alternative—one that is internationalist and anti-imperialist—while maintaining independence from the Cuban regime and condemning its pro-capitalist policies, which only serve to deepen the crisis and lead to the defeat of the revolution’s gains.
Cuba can only free itself from the imperialist and capitalist offensive through the mobilization of workers and the oppressed on the island, in Latin America, but also in the imperialist countries, particularly the U.S.
The workers’ and popular rebellion currently underway in Bolivia against the government of Trump’s lackey Rodrigo Paz, as well as the mobilizations against Kast and Milei, the far-right governments in Chile and Argentina, show the way to defeat Trump and imperialism. Similarly, mass struggles against Trump within the U.S., as we have seen since last year, are essential to defend the Cuban people from the aggression coming from the north.
