As well as the escalating war in Iran, another dangerous conflict continues to rage in Asia. On 27 February, Pakistan’s Minister of Defense Khawaja Muhammad Asif announced that the country was now in an ‘open war’ with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and announced “Operation Ghazab Lil Haq”, or “Operation Righteous Fury” in Arabic.
This declaration followed an escalating period of military strikes and counter-strikes between the two states over the previous weeks. And while more direct confrontation around the border has taken place sporadically since its inception, the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan after the end of the disastrous twenty year war waged by US imperialism has reignited tensions. In particular, it has given confidence to the Pakistan Taliban (TTP), an Islamist insurgent group associated with the ruling Afghan Taliban, to resume its own violent campaigns. This has included a spate of suicide bombings, with the Pakistan Taliban claiming responsibility. Though association is officially denied by the Afghan Taliban, the TTP almost certainly are being allowed safe haven on the Afghan side of the border, which is why this boundary (known as the ‘Durand Line’) is coming back to attention.
The ‘Durand Line’ has long been a source of tension between the two countries. Originally drawn up by British imperialism in 1893, it was inherited by Pakistan after the partition of colonial India in 1947 and has never been accepted in Kabul. It is also rejected by many Baloch and Pashtun people, as it cuts right through their traditional national lands. Because of its contested nature and associated violence – including illegal smuggling operations, murders and kidnapping – this border is regarded as one of the most dangerous in the world.
From Allies to Rivals
This is not just a border clash, however. Despite the claims by Pakistan that it is merely targeting “bases of operations for terrorism in Pakistan”, Pakistani air strikes into major Afghan cities like Kabul and Kandahar clearly outline a different intention – to strike at the Taliban regime itself. Pakistan had historically given shelter to the leadership of the Afghan Taliban during its insurrectionary period. In the 1990s Pakistan was the one of only three governments to recognize its assumption of power in Kabul, when the main point was to sponsor various trends of right-wing political Islam against US imperialist influence regionally. However, the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan without a more direct US military threat on the ground has changed this equation to a confrontational one.
As of 15 March, the carnage of the war had already displaced over 115,000 people according to UN estimates. And while both sides claim they are only striking military or ‘terrorist’ targets, hundreds of civilians are estimated to have been killed. Pakistan has an overwhelming military advantage, both in terms of a large disciplined army and overwhelming superiority in technology and weaponry, mainly supplied by China over a period of years. In contrast, the Taliban is still very much based on guerrilla methods and abandoned US military equipment – perhaps useful for countering an invasion but not for conducting a cross-border war.
For the powers that be in Pakistan, the war is not just about terrorism or the border but also rooted in the broader political context. In May of last year, Pakistan was embroiled in a four-day war with its main regional rival India. On both sides of that conflict, unpopular governments, represented on the Pakistani side by the military, were hoping for a distraction from domestic discontent to gain at least a temporary boost in support. And that is exactly what happened, with some sources showing up to 92% approval for the military in Pakistan directly after the ceasefire.
The shadow of this conflict looms large over the current war, which the Pakistan military hopes to exploit to prop up their own support. Meanwhile, despite the Indian government’s official refusal to recognize the Taliban regime, the two have moved toward closer ties in recent years. India and Pakistan have recently clashed in the UN Security Council with India stating that the airstrikes are “flagrant violations of international law, UN Charter and state sovereignty”. Pakistan replied that “sole objective of [India’s] Afghan policy being to destabilise Pakistan” and went further saying “irrefutable evidence of India’s collusion with terrorist groups that are engaged in orchestrating violent attacks against Pakistan” though the latter is unlikely.
While some sources indicated a slowing of the Pakistani onslaught, another round of air strikes on residential areas in Kandahar and Kabul on Friday 13 March and the death of 400 people in a Pakistani strike on a hospital on Monday cut across this assessment. Instead, we see a continuation of the barbarity, including the butchering of civilians. And despite Pakistan’s claimed ‘neutrality’ in the US-Israeli war on Iran, General Asim Munir’s deepening relationship with Donald Trump and alliance with Saudi Arabia could mean Pakistan being drawn in there as well.
China and India
Chinese imperialism, which has been eager to appear as a ‘global peacemaker’ in contrast to Trump’s aggressive moves over the recent months, has had some role in attempting mediation. However, China has its own concerns at play. It is deeply invested in both countries, especially in the mineral and mining sectors which are becoming more critical to the global struggle with US imperialism. Pakistan in particular is deeply indebted to China to the tune of up to $30 billion as of 2024. This is bigger than any other single creditor including the World Bank, creating a gargantuan repayment burden and fueling economic precarity within the country.
There is also potential for further Indian involvement on the Afghan side. Over the past period India has sought to take advantage of China’s internal woes – both economic and political – to challenge its hegemonic position in the region. Should it see the possibility of strengthening itself versus China through an escalation of its support of Afghanistan in the war, the proxy element, and thus the size and intensity of the war itself, could grow.
What next?
It is possible that in the short-term, some sort of ceasefire is arrived at. However the underlying issues at play are not going to be resolved. Neither the Taliban nor Pakistan’s military rulers have genuine concern for ethnic and religious minorities or the oppressed masses in general. They are both repressive regimes pursuing the conflict for their own ends. And just as in Iran, imperialist intervention will only cause further violence and chaos. A permanent end to the hostilities must be rooted in the genuine self-determination of peoples, which can only be achieved by a united struggle against capitalism and feudalism in the region and for socialist liberation, led by the working class and poor masses.
