“Ultimately, the Swedish welfare state is a result of class struggle”. This conclusion makes Kjell Östberg’s book about the rise and fall of Swedish social democracy an important book.
So far, the book is only available in English, The rise and the fall of Swedish Social Democracy (Verso publishers). The reason is probably the illusions and hopes in the ‘Nordic model’ that were spread in the United States during Bernie Sanders’ election campaigns. He labelled Sweden as ‘socialist’, with welfare reforms that are lacking in the US. But what Sanders missed was the destruction of welfare in recent decades. And just like the Social Democrats in Sweden, Sanders capitulated instead of challenging capital and the right.
Kjell Östberg is history professor and member of Socialistisk Politik (part of the so-called “Fourth International”). His ambition is to provide a comprehensive picture of Swedish social democracy, from the last decades of the 19th century to today. It describes a party whose support among the working class has plummeted from over 80 percent to the current situation where it competes with the racist Sweden Democrats at a level below 30 percent. Behind this, of course, are the party’s policies, which went from clear advances with a hope of fundamentally changing society to austerity and privatisations
The great historical split in the labour movement came with the First World War and the period 1917–21, which Östberg rightly calls “probably the deepest, most dramatic and violent period of radicalisation”. The Social Democratic leadership followed most of their sister parties in Europe — peace with the bourgeoisie during the war (Sweden was not belligerent) followed by deals with capitalists like the Wallenberg family and the right-wing party to divert the fundamentally revolutionary struggle in 1917–18.
Östberg explains this, but partly excuses the right-wing course with quotes from the American professor Adam Przeworski, who says that party programmes are watered down in attempts to get more votes in elections and reach outside the working class. ‘Party strategists’ may think so, but in reality the Social Democratic party gained its strongest support, including outside the working class, when the party was perceived as radical and aiming to change society.
Östberg also paints an unclear picture of the Russian Revolution, emphasising the dissolution of the ‘Constituent Assembly’ rather than describing the workers taking power and giving hope to millions around the world. He does not mention that the Constituent Assembly had almost no supporters and that in the same year it was dissolved, 1918, the counter-revolution, with the support of 100,000 troops from other states, launched a civil war against the workers’ regime with the aim of establishing a military dictatorship.
International developments in the 1920s and 30s is generally the weakest part of the book. Both developments in Russia and the rise of fascism are explained by “mass psychology” and “primitive impulses”, with reference to Sigmund Freud. And “the reason for Nazism’s victory was that the German bourgeoisie traditionally lacked both democratic convictions and solid democratic parties”. Here it would have been appropriate to refer to Leon Trotsky’s analysis and programme. Stalinism was not the result of the Russian Revolution, but of the defeat of revolutions in other countries and the emergence of a bureaucracy under Stalin’s leadership. Fascism was the tool of the capitalist class to crush the labour movement. The book also gives an uncritical picture of the Popular Front policy that led to defeat in the Spanish Civil War.
Östberg gives a good description of Social Democratic policy in Sweden after the election victory in 1932, which ushered in the long period in government until 1976. There was no master plan for reform, nor was the policy characterised by Keynesian deficit policies. The main focus was on favourable conditions for large companies, to create economic growth. In this spirit, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) made a deal with the employers association, SAF, the Saltsjöbaden Agreement, the main purpose of which was to curb strikes. In fact, the Swedish economy in the 1930s was boosted by exports to Nazi Germany’s military armoury.
In exchange for labour peace, the capitalists were able to accept certain social reforms, such as child benefits introduced in 1947. Companies still made huge profits, as Swedish industry had a head start over competitors in countries that had been at war. This laid the foundation for higher living standards and the most important reform, the pension system ATP, which was introduced after fierce battles in the late 1950s and provided perhaps the best pensions for workers in any country.
The chapter on the 1970s is aptly titled A socialist Sweden? “It was in the 1970s that big changes took place. The scale of the social and political reforms introduced in this period was unprecedented, even by international standards.” Östberg calls the decade “the high point of democratic socialism.”
The two-month long strike of 4,500 miners in 1969–70 was followed by several major strikes and struggles, which together with a strong international radicalisation to the left put pressure on the social democratic leadership and the entire establishment. As Östberg points out, this was based on movements and organisations beyond the Social Democrats, among women, young people and environmentalists. Now came a wave of reforms, which were implemented under public auspices and had massive support. Childcare was massively expanded, a government plan and investment provided a million new homes in 10 years, holidays became four weeks long, abortion rights were introduced, as were parental leave and expanded adult education. The strikes and radicalisation had a major impact in the workplaces, with important reforms such as the Work Environment Act and laws to protect jobs and union influence.
The Social Democratic leadership constantly acted to slow down and control movements from below, with campaigns against communists and socialists. In the 1970s, this was done with radical language, as pressure mounted from below to take the ‘next step’ to a socialist society. The response from the top was a proposal called wage earner funds, which would gradually give unions more power in companies through ownership in funds.
Despite the major limitations of the proposal, capitalists responded with furious and well-organised opposition to ‘socialism’. This coincided with the introduction of neo-liberalism — the policy of capitalist globalisation to demolish welfare and attack workers’ rights. The right wanted to become a traditional right-wing again, having been pushed back throughout the post-war period. On 4 October 1983, a reactionary march of thousands was led by the employers’ federation to parliament.
The Social Democratic leadership backed down immediately. When it returned to power in 1982 after six years of centre-right governments, a new era of austerity policies began. This did not happen without protests, but they were cancelled after the assassination of Social Democratic Prime Minister, Olof Palme, in 1986.
During the crisis of the 1990s, the party leadership supported the big cuts of the 1991–94 right-wing government and continued in the same spirit when they won the 1994 election. Privatisations, the fastest growing income gaps in Europe, halved pensions and even more cuts were implemented regardless of government.
For readers of Offensiv (ISA paper in Sweden), the transformation of Social Democracy is nothing new. Our paper started in 1973 as a Marxist opposition within the Social Democratic youth league and party, which still had a membership made up of workers. We were expelled when the party returned to government power in 1982, and the leadership wanted to stop a powerful left-wing opposition. In the 1990s, we led several large protest movements against prime minister Göran Persson’s world record in cuts. Against this background, it feels strange that Östberg dates Social Democracy’s complete degeneration to 2022! Another shortcoming is that he completely misses the leadership’s right-wing line on refugee policies and on NATO.
Kjell Östberg’s book is well worth reading, as a reminder of the consequences of Social Democracy never challenging the power of capital.
