A context of generalized crisis and security problems in the East
For many observers of Congolese political life, these elections were a test for the ‘Congolese institutions’. They claim that last time they had succeeded in ensuring the first peaceful political transition in the country’s history. Despite grotesque electoral fraud, Félix Tshisekedi’s accession to power was then accepted by the ‘international community’ based on a power-sharing agreement with Kabila. This was a compromise that ensured the relative stability of this geostrategically important country as the European Union and the United States, considered Fatshi, short for Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi, the safest option for the country’s international relations.
Democratic rights are not isolated from social rights. A profoundly unequal society is incapable of guaranteeing collective or individual democratic rights. Similarly, a democratic society is only truly democratic when those who produce wealth decide how to use it to meet social needs.
From this angle, the entire electoral process can be described as undemocratic, not because of the electoral process itself, but because Congolese society as a whole remains marked by a general crisis in which poverty, unemployment, lack of access to healthcare and insecurity form the daily reality for the majority of the population.
Election results
On December 20, more than 40 million people were called to the polls in over 75,000 polling stations. Due to the security or logistical situation, some regions were simply unable to vote. 100,000 candidates ran for office, as did 70 different parties and coalitions.
In “The Class Struggle in France” (1850), Karl Marx had already highlighted one of the fundamental contradictions of bourgeois democracies of the presidential type. On the one hand, the entire electorate casts its votes for a person who holds executive power; on the other, this same electorate is divided among 500 deputies. This is the root of the institutional crisis. Tshisekedi, who emerged from a fraudulent electoral compromise with the former ruling clique, resolved this contradiction by literally buying his presidential majority in parliament. This enabled him to organize elections without being confronted by a real organized opposition.
The results proclaimed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) for the presidential elections gave Tshisekedi the winner with 73.47%. Moise Katumbi obtained 18.08%, Martin Fayulu 4.92% and the other candidates, including Nobel Prize winner Denis Mukwege, known for his commitment against genital mutilation, had less than 1%.
These results were contested by the opposition, who called a demonstration, which was banned and repressed. The entire electoral process was marked by fraud, irregularities and logistical difficulties. The people who turned out en-masse to take part in the vote had to show enormous courage and patience to reach the polling stations. This is an unequivocal sign that, despite the difficult situation in which the population finds itself, there is real support for the victory achieved in the fight against Kabila’s third term in the form of democratic rights.
Tshisekedi’s victory was expected for two different reasons. Firstly, he had bought his parliamentary majority and appointed a close friend to head the CENI, Denis Kadima. The appointment of this head of the CENI was ratified by the 8 religious confessions, while 2 of them, the Catholic Church and the main Protestant federation, abstained.
Denis Kadima has of course done everything to favour his ally. A German NGO studied the entire electoral process under the aegis of the CENI and its conclusions are edifying. The institution was shrouded in secrecy, and there were strong suspicions that it had been biased. The government claims to have paid over 1 billion dollars to organise the elections. CENI claims to have received 930 million. 161 million has disappeared. What’s more, the money transfers were made through commercial banks and not via the central bank, which means that there is no control possible. (Lalibre.Be, ‘Elections en RDC: les dépenses de la Ceni congolaise passées à la loupe, Hubert Leclerq’, 9 January).
This colossal budget can be explained by the size of the country and the logistical difficulties caused by its poor infrastructure. But neither this nor the increase in the number of CENI staff prevented problems from marring the day’s proceedings, which had to be extended. In addition, 82 deputy elections were cancelled following serious irregularities.
The second reason why Tshisekedi’s election was so eagerly awaited lay not in the strength or relevance of the candidate’s programme, but in the weakness of the opposition. Fatshi took over the leadership of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), one of the best structured parties in Congolese politics. At the time, his father, Etienne, had broken with Mobutu’s Mouvement populaire de la Révolution (MPR), the former single party of the dictatorship that he had helped to create. He established himself as the “eternal opponent” of Mobutu, Kabila senior and then Kabila junior. This contributed to the political credibility of his political group, an organisation that celebrated its 40th anniversary in 2022. It also has branches in several countries where the Congolese diaspora is present.
Finally, Tshisekedi has not hesitated to play the policy of divide and rule. He has maintained the policy of gerrymandering, the self-serving unequal division of electoral districts, at provincial level in order to weaken his main opponent, Katumbi. He has favoured the elites of his community to win their support. He also restricted the autonomy of the provinces to increase the centralisation of power.
The Catholic and Protestant churches, which deployed 24,000 observers, noted irregularities but did not question Tshisekedi’s victory, even if his 73.47% figure is not credible.
Tshisekedi’s record
On 21 December 2023, the IMF made an assessment of the programme put in place for the Congo: “Performance under the programme has been satisfactory overall, but structural reforms have been delayed. The authorities have taken vigorous corrective action to remedy the failure to meet the achievement criteria related to the fiscal situation and debt service management, for which waivers have been granted. Two structural benchmarks, aimed at increasing transparency, raising tax revenues, and improving public investment management, have been met with a delay, while efforts are being made to support better execution of social spending.”
Clearly, Tshisekedi was favoured by the international institutions in the Bretton Woods camp, named after the 1944 conference that mapped out the post-Second World War international financial system. But this soothing comment is completely out of step with the lives of millions of Congolese. It is not possible here to give a full analysis of the prospects for the DRC, but a few elements of Tshisekedi’s record are interesting.
The main measure of the five-year term was the introduction of free compulsory primary education, a measure that had been voted under Kabila. Its implementation over the last 5 years has certainly contributed to Tshisekedi’s electoral success, despite the difficulties: class sizes, non-payment of civil servants, poor infrastructure, security situation (with 7 million displaced persons in the country). In addition, massive poverty and inequality prevent education from playing its role as a vehicle for social emancipation.
Alongside this, there has also been an increase in army budgets and a massive recruitment of young soldiers. This has had a major impact on the state budget. What’s more, there has been a clear failure in terms of security. In the east, it is estimated that there were 121 armed groups at the beginning of Fatshi’s rule. Today, it is estimated that there are twice as many or more.
Despite significant growth in numbers (6.8% in 2023 according to the World Bank), it is not creating jobs or solving any problems for the masses. The state budget has grown from €5.7 billion to €16 billion, but this is essentially due to the increase in the price of raw materials and the extraction industry. The IMF estimates inflation at 22% and the depreciation of the Congolese franc at 15%.
What way out for the social majority?
The elections have confirmed that the political family running the country has indeed changed. But for the rest, the situation has not changed for the social majority. In its post-electoral communiqué, the protest movement La Lucha (Struggle for Change), calls for the resignation of the entire CENI and the complete annulment of the elections if serious irregularities are found. It also salutes the Congolese people for their commitment to the electoral process.
Defending the gains made in the fight against the third mandate of Kabila is essential. But it is not enough. In many West African countries that had enjoyed relative institutional stability, political crises and coups d’état are on the increase. This is ultimately due to the multiple crises of capitalism. In these regions, illusions about democracy are crumbling, not because people are not attached to their democratic rights, but because the political regime has not solved the problems facing the social majority. The resulting social protest has given way to military coups or attempted coups in several states.
One of the elements that will be crucial in the Congo and in the region will be to rebuild independent organisations so that the social majority can make its interests heard and fight for them.
