As the war was reaching its 500-day point, the mutiny of the Wagner group led by Evgeniy Prigozhin shook the Russian regime. The capture of Rostov, a city of a million people, and the thousand kilometer forced march towards Moscow demonstrated the weakness of the Putin regime, and marked yet another convulsion in its long drawn-out decline. Now the Kremlin is claiming responsibility for ensuring a ‘peaceful resolution’, and that society has stood firm and united against the mutiny, but it is increasingly clear it is losing its grip. The mutiny is a prelude to more serious shocks and crises that will open up in the future.
Prigozhin’s statements against the military hierarchy, against corruption, and criticising the regime’s narrative that the war was against NATO gained an echo amongst a section of the Regular army, who are suffering the consequences and part of the wider population. OMON and National Guard troops stood watching as the Wagner column marched. Although it was noticeable that, apart from in Rostov itself, there were no crowds cheering the “March for Justice”, at the same time there was no open display of support for the regime either.
In Moscow there were elements of panic. Although many ordinary people were either unaware or unconcerned about the approaching column at least until it neared the capital, a different mood affected the elite. The ‘Moscow Times’ reported that they were confused and lacking information. They quote one high ranking official ‘close to the government’ as saying “Everyone is f***ing losing it and doomscrolling.” Over 100 billion rubles [one billion euros] was withdrawn from the banks during the day. Airline tickets sold out at highly speculative prices as state employees and others sought ways out of the city. The private jets of at least two oligarchs, and the Minister of the Economy were tracked leaving Moscow. Other stayed — the management of one state owned company in Moscow called together employees with military experience, issued them with weapons and sent them to patrol surrounding streets.
Across Russia, in many of its regions and ethnic republics there was also concern. The far-eastern Sakha republic was celebrating its New Year holiday. Many opposed to the war avoided the public celebrations, which went on unaware of the news. Buryatia, Tatarstan and other republics held summer celebrations, or to mark youth day. One Buryat activist called this the modern equivalent of ‘Swan Lake’, the ballet broadcast round the clock by state TV during the 1991 coup. Several regional heads used the events as an excuse to avoid committing their support to the Kremlin. Moscow mayor Sobyanin and Premier Mishustin were among those who kept a low profile during the day. Head of Tatarstan, the oil-rich central Russian Muslim republic usually loyal to the Kremlin sent a message of support to the Kremlin, but refused to publish it within the republic. The Head of Buryatia even sent a video to Wagner expressing concern for loved ones “no matter if they are listed in the Armed Forces…or Wagner. We are watching all your ups and downs equally.” Even Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Republic took 16 hours to declare his position, when it was already clear that the mutiny was coming to an end. His advisors said this was because he had been sleeping!
Wagner in Chechnya is particularly unpopular, as many of its leading officers participated in the two brutal Chechen wars. There is particular dislike for Dmitriy Utkin, Prigozhin’s deputy who was responsible for civilian massacres in both Chechnya and Syria. He inspired the name ‘Wagner” and is a fanatic supporter of the ‘Third Reich’. Even so, there were Chechens who wanted to see Wagner gain some success, with the hope that the “‘Putinists and Wagnerists would kill each other and leave the rest of us alone.” In Sakha, a poll conducted by an anti-war group suggested that 70% of those asked were disappointed that Prigozhin failed, but only because they thought it would alter the course of the war in Ukraine. A national poll, conducted for the Kremlin’s own use indicated that up to 30% of the population had some sympathy with Prigozhins’s attacks on the authorities.
A section of the pro-capitalist opposition also supported the mutiny. The oligarch in exile Khodorkovsky spoke openly in support of Wagner calling on his supporters to: “arm themselves,” as the rebellion “proved that only armed people can stand up to dictatorship.” He has aligned himself with the ‘Russian Volunteer Corps’ — the Russian far-right using the Ukraine war to launch armed incursions into Russia. These calls demonstrate the real nature of a section of the bourgeoisie. They do not care about genuine democracy, and are quite prepared to support military and fascist forces to protect their interests. Other liberal activists such as Alexey Navalny’s group warned about support for either side, but offered no strategy apart from warning of the danger of Russia sinking into civil war.
Some commentators pointed to the scenes in Rostov as Wagner troops were leaving, to suggest that they had wide public support in the city. This is a simplification. As elsewhere, there was a layer of support for Prigozhin’s criticism of the army, particularly as many have friends and relatives in the army. But as rostovchani woke up on the Saturday morning to find the military sites in their city, in which Russia’s Southern army command is located, occupied. But Wagner troops in the city acted politely — after all, mercenary groups such as Wagner developed out of the “polite people” [deniable troops in uniforms without insignia] used by the Kremlin to take over Crimea in 2014. During the day it appeared that an almost holiday atmosphere took hold around the Wagner forces. Towards evening, however, as the column closed on Moscow and news appeared that Kadyrov was sending Chechen troops to confront Wagner in Rostov tension grew. When Wagner withdrew later in the evening from Rostov a mixture of support for, and relief that an open conflict in the city had been avoided fuelled the applause of the few hundreds who had gathered. One woman was overheard to say on her phone: “thank god it’s over. There won’t be war”.
What was behind the “March for Justice”.
The Wagner group — officially a ‘Private Military Company’ (PMC) — is not the only, but by far the best-known mercenary group used by the Russian regime. As with Dmitriy Utkin, they are often led and inspired by far-right, if not openly fascist commanders. They are a convenient way of sending military forces to defend Russian interests, widely used in Syria, Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, and of course Ukraine. Even though, as Putin since the mutiny has admitted, Wagner has been largely financed from the Russian budget, the government can deny responsibility for their actions, and the forces themselves can ignore the normally accepted ‘rules of conflict’. Many of Wagner’s soldiers were recruited from Russia’s prisons, and were not only brutal in their actions, but were brutally treated as cannon fodder.
Prigozhin has, for months, been complaining bitterly about the corruption and incompetence of the regular army leadership — General Gerasimov and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu in particular. During the battle for Bakhmut he bitterly accused them of denying his forces the necessary ammunition to continue. The trigger for the mutiny itself appears to have been another rocket attack on Wagner troops by the regular army. But there is now much speculation, and of course conspiracy theories, about Prigozhin’s aims in launching his action.
Initial reports spoke of an attempted coup. It was indeed more than a simple protest. An attempt to stop the column’s progress using an aerial attack ended up with several aircraft destroyed and pilots and crew killed. Road blocks, machine gun posts and defensive barricades appeared at least on Moscow’s southern borders. But if Wagner was seriously considering taking over Moscow it had seriously underestimated the task. The city already has experience of resisting and defeating a military coup — in 1991 when the notorious hard line putchists tried to overthrow Gorbachev, hundreds of thousands of Moscovites mobilised against the coup, and in the process undermined the rule of Gorbachev too.
More likely is that Prigozhin’s aim was to force his friend in the Kremlin to move against Gerasimov and Shoigu. There is information to suggest that when the march set off, it was in the belief that Putin would be open to negotiate as long as the two men met. But Shoigu, who had been in Rostov, managed to flee the city and reached Putin first. This, it is suggested, led to Putin’s angry televised address in which he described Prigozhin, although not by name, of treachery, warning he would be arrested and or eliminated.
As defences were being built in Moscow, troops were being rushed in from other regions to support the city. Events appeared to be rapidly approaching an open conflict, when it was announced an agreement negotiated by Belarusian president Lukashenko had been reached. Clearly Wagner’s leadership had realised that despite what appeared to be considerable latent support, it did not have the strength to tackle Moscow head-on, and would probably have been completely destroyed if it tried.
As if the day’s events had not been humiliating enough for Putin, Lukashenko later in a long rambling press conference boasted of his own role in conducting negotiations. He claimed he had talked Putin out of ordering Prigozhin’s assassination, and made the most of how he had saved the day. He even said that if Prigozhin had attacked Moscow, the Belarusian army was ready to help. Particularly ironic, as he has refused to allow Belarusian troops to be used openly in Ukraine.
What has happened to Prigozhin and Wagner since the agreement only heightens the suspicion of a regime in crisis mode. The agreement announced on the 24th June suggested that the order to arrest Prigozhin had been annulled, and that he and his troops would relocate to Belarus. Seemingly to continue putting pressure on him, state TV continued for days to highlight his criminal past and treachery. It now emerges that while this was going on, Prigozhin and 35 of his ‘musicians’ [Wagner’s commanders] were invited into the Kremlin for a 3-hour discussion on their future, the outcome of which has not been revealed.
Consequences
Despite organising an armed mutiny, which left several dead, no members of Wagner have been arrested or charged. This is in stark contrast to the continuing actions against those speaking out against the war — even people wearing clothes matching the colours of the Ukrainian flag, or having dreamt of a meeting with Zelensky have faced detention in the recent period. It was reported that General Surovkin [Armageddon], who supposedly knew in advance of the mutiny has been arrested and has not been seen, although it is now reported that he has been ‘resting’ in the Caucasus.
It appears that after his angry speech about a “knife in the back” during the mutiny, Putin was pressurised by those around him to reach an agreement with Prigozhin. Some may well have reminded him of the conflict after WW2 between Stalin and General Zhukov, the popular military leader who the former saw as a possible threat to his rule. Fearful that if Prigozhin was pushed out of the inner circle he would continue to campaign and build his forces, maybe next time to return with greater support Putin seems to be trying to reign in the mutineer. At the same time, without publicly making any concessions to Prigozhin, it has been reported that General Gerasimov, although keeping his titles, has been removed from the overall leadership of the war against Ukraine.
Of course, as the outcome became clear, those who had been slow to express their loyalty to the Tsar rushed to do so. The leaders of all the recognised parties all expressed their support in gushing terms. It is clear, however, that there is a search within the ruling elite and its state apparatus to ensure that anyone who sympathised with the mutiny are removed from their positions. It may be that over a dozen Generals have fallen victim to this, and even been arrested.
Premier Mishustin met with Putin in the days after the mutiny to assure him that all members of the government were at their desks during the mutiny to ensure that the economy remained stable. This is against the background of continuing sanctions and lethargic economic growth, that looks as if it will have a job meeting this year’s forecast of 1.5%. Despite being short-lived, the mutiny led to panic buying at least in the areas through which Wagner passed. As significantly there was a certain panic, according to Reuters in China, where business associations met the news with instructions to companies to stop exporting to Russia. The mutiny triggered a new and so far steady devaluation of the ruble, which has lost over 10% of its value since June 24.
International responses
Understandably, the reaction in Ukraine was initially based on the hope that the mutiny could succeed, and the war brought to an end. This is even though Prigozhin made quite clear that his aim was to conduct the war more efficiently. Ukraine’s leadership saw this as an opportunity to push ahead as Russian forces were weakened and confused. One Ukrainian strategist even suggested that Ukrainian forces should move into Russia itself to surround the Russian troops in Ukraine. Such ideas were supported by the far-right Russian Volunteer Corps, who wanted to use the potential chaos to launch a military campaign in Russia itself.
The US were quick to warn the Ukrainian army not to do this. They not only feared that such actions would increase the likelihood of the break-up of Russia into an unstable and unpredictable ‘failed state’, but were also concerned that they would provoke one or other of the factions into using nuclear, or other so far unused massively destructive weapons. It has been reported that a group of Wagner fighters attempted to take control of a nuclear weapons store en-route to Moscow, and were only prevented from doing so by security locks.
The ultimate perspective of the breakup of the Russian state into chaos and civil war brought home to many western leaders the dangers inherent in the current situation. They may not like Putin, but they fear that a military takeover by someone like Prigozhin could be even worse. These fears feed in to strengthen the growing caution in western, including in US circles of not supporting Ukraine so far, that such possibilities are made more probable. The results have been seen now with Zelensky’s disappointment at the results of the NATO summit.
Alarm bells will have been ringing in Beijing too, as it began to look as if the Kremlin could not even put down the mutiny. Initially China looked on Russia as a strong military partner in the developing new cold war, but is increasingly being forced to realise Russia’s weaknesses. It fears instability breaking out in Russia, with which it shares a 4200 kilometer border. It also understands that the continuation of the war is undermining its own strategy of trying to drive a wedge between the US and EU. Since the mutiny it has emerged that Xi Jinping personally warned Putin against using nuclear weapons during his March visit, repeating the warning given earlier through diplomatic channels after Russia started bombing Ukriane’s cities. The Chinese regime always studies the experiences of Russian rule, in the aftermath of the Prigozhin mutiny Xi Jinping moved to tighten CCP control over the Chinese army and to ensure that there would be no outsourcing of military tasks to private companies.
What now?
The image of a strong and unified leadership has been severely damaged by this mutiny. It will encourage the different power centres, whether in the armed forces and security services, the regions, and increasingly the corporations which are already building their own mercenary and security forces to strengthen their own positions in preparation for new conflicts within the elite. This raises the prospect of a break-up of Russia again into warring factions and regions, as happened in the early 1990s as capitalism was restored. It is no exaggeration to suggest that if Prigozhin had been successful in seizing control in Moscow, this could have triggered a multi-vectoral civil war.
Prigozhin’s claims that “ the war was badly planned, that the Kremlin’s claims that Ukraine and NATO were planning to attack Russia were lies, and that the situation on the front from Russian point of view is desperate” will further undermine the narrative pushed by the Kremlin. Had Prigozhin succeeded, Russia would have been in the hands of an open military dictatorship. Now to maintain its position at least until the next convulsion the Kremlin will have to continue with repression measures and leave Putin even more reliant on the regular military, national guard and FSB structures, balancing between them to maintain power. But they will already understand that Putin has been weakened.
Even if formally, Shoigu and Gerasimov retain their titles and ranks, their authority has been seriously undermined. There is still discontent within the army, and there is reportedly a purge taking place to ensure that all those in positions of authority are loyal. Still, discontent within the army is surfacing publicly. The latest to speak out, Major-General Ivan Popov, now removed as head of the 58th Combined Arms division fighting in the Zaporozhe region complained that his troops were not being defeated by Ukrainian forces, but “was hit from the rear by our senior chief, treacherously and nefariously decapitating the army at the most difficult and tense moment.”
The Prigozhin mutiny has served as a warning not just to the ruling elite in Russia, and the imperialist powers. It should also serve as a warning to the Russian working class and oppressed groups of what could happen unless a working-class socialist alternative is not built. This means the building of a powerful anti-war movement in Russia, which recognizes the right of Ukraine to self-determination and demanding the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Ukraine with no annexations with opposition to mobilization and the organized blocking of military activities, full support for soldiers, and the mobilized who refuse to fight, to their relatives and friends who protest against the war.
This combined with an organized working-class struggle against cuts in the budget for the social sector, for an increase in wages in line with inflation, against job cuts, support and solidarity with those facing repression, for the freeing of all political prisoners will prepare the ground for the building of a working-class left-wing political alternative to the bonapartist regime. This should be built in solidarity and cooperation with all those fighting in other imperialist countries in an organized way against all attacks on workers, rights, those of women and LGBTQ+, for organised mass strike action against wage cuts and inflation, job losses and the attacks on pension rights, for the building of mass action-based socialist parties capable of challenging the power of capital.
