DIE LINKE, the left party in Germany, is facing an existential crisis 15 years after its foundation. After poor election results, the differences within the party intensified. Now, two camps are facing off, with differences seeming irreconcilable. On the one hand a wing around Sahra Wagenknecht, undeniably the most famous member of the party, with her populist rhetoric receiving applause from far into the right. On the other hand a new alliance calling itself “Progressive Left“, made up of the centre-left and the reformist wing of the party. A split seems unavoidable.
Wagenknecht started causing trouble in her party in 2016 when she spoke of “abusers of hospitality“, “capacity limits” and “potential dangers” in connection with refugees. With “aufstehen” (rise up), she attempted to found a movement that was perhaps to become the embryo of a new party — but failed miserably. In her book “Die Selbstgerechten” (The Self-Righteous), she attacked a left that was more concerned with “bizarre minorities” than with the social question and described her political direction as “left-wing conservative”. Recently, her positions on the war in Ukraine (correctly calling sanctions against Russia “economic warfare“, but only because it would hurt German industry) or on the Greens (the “most dangerous party in the Bundestag”) have polarised opinion. In an interview she said that a new party is needed, but that it is not so easy to found one.
Frequently, the accusation of “cross-front” (a tactic of Nazis pretending a common front with communists) ambitions is thrown against her; the Free Democratic Party (FDP) parliamentary group vice-chairman even compared her to the former Red Army Faction lawyer and later neo-Nazi Horst Mahler. It is necessary to criticise her for taking up right-wing talking points. But her political outlook is actually not much more right-wing than old fashioned right-wing social democracy. When she talked about the state “losing control” in the face of larger numbers of refugees, that was reactionary, but no more reactionary than the regular state racism with its deadly EU external borders.
Her rhetoric is more populist than that of other right-wing social democrats. But they have one important common denominator: The framework of their policies is strictly within the bourgeois nation-state. Wagenknecht is perceived by many as the voice of protest: in reality she only pursues populist proxy politics, hoping that she’ll get the protest vote. Any movement outside of the ballot box is alien to her.
The “Progressive Left”
Seemingly in direct contrast to this is the “Progressive Left”, the recently formally founded anti-Wagenknecht alliance, made up of members of the political current “Bewegungslinke“ (“Movement Left”) and parts of the influential “Reformers“. Apart from being united in what they are against, the block is otherwise unprincipled. The “Reformers“ are, to put it in a nutshell, those who want to govern at almost any price, subordinating themselves to the laws of bourgeois rule. “Bewegungslinke“ want to see the party build social movements, and “to move away from the dominance of parliamentary work and become an organising, educating and connecting party” (Bewegungslinke’s manifesto).
Both currents argue against Wagenknecht and her ideas from completely different standpoints. Members of Bewegungslinke are unhappy with her focus on the nation state and a populism that leans towards the supposedly more “conservative“ parts of the working class and dismisses questions of gender equality or climate justice as “left-liberal“. The Reformers on the other hand are worried that Wagenknecht represents above all a sentiment of protest, especially against the potential coalition partners, the SPD and Greens, therefore acting as a barrier for the oh so dear government participation. The common alliance represents Bewegungslinke’s path to conformity with the status quo.
Sahra Wagenknecht: Everyone knows her, many like her, many don’t. But this article is not about Wagenknecht as a person; rather, we name her as representative of an entire current in DIE LINKE and beyond, which argues in a similar way.
Populäre Linke (Popular Left) is the title of an appeal that circulated before the 2022 Erfurt Party Congress and found support beyond the borders of the Wagenknecht camp.
Sozialistische Linke (Socialist Left, SL) is the former largest current in DIE LINKE, with an orientation towards trade unions and the welfare state. In 2019, the current split into pro — and anti-Wagenknecht tendencies. Since then, politically more traditional social democratic, populist and economist (largely reducing demands to wages and benefits, less on climate, sexism, racism).
Bewegungslinke (Movement Left, BL) emerged from the split of the SL, is anti-Wagenknecht and as a current the left centre of the party. In terms of content, it lacks agreement in key questions (e.g. government participation), but is successful in winning party executive mandates. However, the current shies away from organising left majorities on central substantive issues and often relies on compromises with reformers in the name of party unity.
Reformers are, in short, those with the greatest will to govern. In the splitting process, they can be found on both sides — in the Bundestag parliamentary group, there was for years an alliance between the faction leaders Wagenknecht and Bartsch (a prominent Reformer), the so-called “horseshoe alliance”. But there have always been Wagenknecht opponents among the reformers, most recently called “progressive reformers” in the party.
Progressive Linke (Progressive Left) is the cross-currents alliance that basically demands Wagenknecht’s secession.
Antikapitalistische Linke (Anti-Capitalist Left, AKL) is a largely coherent radical left current that warns against government participation and illusions in the reformability of capitalism and fights for inner-party democracy. From the beginning, it has clearly positioned itself against Wagenknecht’s course in terms of content, but also rejects the adaptation to the “reformers”. The SAV is part of the AKL.
Should DIE LINKE participate in pro capitalist governments?
The question if DIE LINKE should be participating in governments was central in the internal debates since the fusion of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) the successor of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, (SED — ruling party of the GDR), and Labour and Social Justice — The Electoral Alternative. Members of SAV have been arguing against government participation and the focus on parliamentarism since the very beginning. Instead, we explained, DIE LINKE should be built as an anticapitalist party, building social and labour movements, expressing opposition to all the other parties that had attacked the living standards of working-class and poor people. Due to the standing we had in the formation period of the party, especially in Berlin, and because of our consistency of criticising austerity measures where DIE LINKE or their predecessors were part of the government, we were a key factor in sewing a seed of opposition to joining capitalist governments.
The PDS, on the other hand, had been supporting the SPD in state-level coalition governments since the mid-1990s. A majority of their members in the former GDR felt that socialism had failed in Eastern Europe and that there was no alternative to capitalism post-1989. They still called themselves “socialists”, but in their eyes their main task was to defend the impoverished East German working class against neoliberal attacks and keep the traditional bourgeois parties, the Christain Democratic Union(CDU) and FDP, out of power. Ironically they ended up in state governments with the very parties that implemented historic neoliberal reforms and the biggest welfare cuts in Germany since World War 2: the SPD and Greens. DIE LINKE inherited participation in government coalitions in several eastern German states from the PDS and also entered new coalitions, for example in Thuringia, where Bodo Ramelow became DIE LINKE’s first Minister-President. Ramelow made clear from day one that he was “the governor of all Thuringians” and that the party’s programme would not be relevant for his political decisions.
In the western states the PDS had not undergone the same process of assimilation, also the majority of party members came from the WASG, a new party that had evolved from the mass movement against the austerity Regime of SPD and Greens in 2004, basically a left-split of former SPD members and trade unionists that later merged with the PDS to form DIE LINKE. Many members joined after the fusion, so the idea of participation in bourgeois governments was less popular among the rank-and-file members and in many states there were no clear majorities for or against such coalitions. But as the dynamic of the first years ebbed, the mass protests against the austerity of the SPD and Greens were forgotten in the 16 year long rule of Angela Merkel. In 2018 DIE LINKE entered its first west German state government in Bremen, after SPD and Greens lost their majority and needed DIE LINKE to stay in power.
In the best case these centre-left governments slowed down the deterioration of social services or implemented minor improvements that were so small that most working class and poor people didn’t even notice, and bent to the budget pressure and implemented cuts in the worst case. The most prominent member of the “reformer“ camp, Dietmar Bartsch, accidentally got to the heart of the matter: When a member of DIE LINKE became the provisional Minister-President in the state Mecklenburg-Vorpommern he said “nothing happened!“ — as if that were something to be proud of. As a result of this policy in alignment with the establishment, disillusioned voters turned away, resulting in the vote count of DIE LINKE crashing down. In the same time, the field was left wide open for the far-right AfD to pose as the only anti-establishment and protest vote, especially in eastern Germany, where unemployment and poverty became a structural part of everyday life after the fall of Stalinism and the deindustrialisation that followed the privatisation of former state-owned industry.
In their founding declaration the newly formed “progressive left“ alliance claims that the debate on the question of government participation had overshadowed more important questions:
“First of all, there is the fact that the differences over the question of whether leftists should govern or not and other related questions, have long been considered more important than the struggle over the progressive character of the party and the basic values of the programme”.
Now, of course the question whether or not to participate in coalitions is not the only important question. But it is not merely a tactical question either, and stems from fundamental questions: What is the position of the party in relation to the bourgeois state, its parties, its institutions? Should a leftist party remain within the framework of the market economy or go further and strive to abolish capitalism? Can a socialist society be realistically achieved, and if yes, how?
On these decisive questions, that of government, state and economic system, reformers and Wagenknecht leftists are in fact in agreement: the Wagenknecht left perhaps wants to be more of a protest party, but does not question the framework of market economy and bourgeois state, just as little as the supporters of government participation of DIE LINKE with pro-capitalist parties.
Pluralism, compromises, political randomness
The non-position of “Bewegungslinke” on this question is characteristic of the party itself. DIE LINKE attempted to bring together all currents left of the SPD: Left social democrats and revolutionaries, left populists and trade union organisers, old SED cadres and young feminists. Under the impression of larger social movements (against the Agenda 2010 policy of SPD and Greens in 2003–2005) and an upswing of left ideas after the economic crisis in 2008, this went well for a while.
Pluralism, the coexistence of different currents and approaches, was initially attractive because a united left seemed possible. As long as the party went in one direction and faced relatively clear issues — fighting neoliberalism and austerity, positioning itself against NATO-led wars — it worked.
But the crisis of pluralism was already implanted with its foundation. DIE LINKE has always been “two parties in one”: on the one hand, an anti-capitalist party with an orientation towards movements and labour struggles; on the other hand, a government party in waiting, which proved its willingness to swallow all the bitter pills and implement neoliberal policies as an appendage of the SPD and the Greens.
To gain majorities in the multi-faceted party, but also to get access to parliamentary seats and well paid jobs, unprincipled blocks were formed. The “horseshoe alliance“ of the (supposedly left) Wagenknecht wing and the (relatively right-wing) Reformers around Dietmar Bartsch was formed to control the parliamentary group. Criticism against Wagenknechts bad takes on refugees or oppressed minorities were brushed away and she was reelected as a candidate for the Bundestag, with leading members stating that she was too popular to be rejected.
This approach of constant compromises led to political randomness. It didn’t help that the pluralism of the party was expressed in the idea that chairpersons should be elected in parity — one candidate from the left wing of the party, one from the right, one from eastern germany, one from the west etc. The lack of a clear programme(not to speak of a marxist analysis of history or current perspectives), the complete absence of any kind of political education, and no culture of taking time for political debates impoverished the political level within the party.
This was only accelerated by the more complex crises of capitalism in the last 10 years: Wars in a multipolar world, refugee movements, climate crisis and the pandemic. The new political questions were not answered cohesively, which led to an escalation of confusion and arbitrariness in the party. A party in which pro-government forces, “transatlantic” friends of NATO, Covid deniers and Putin supporters are trying to sing together in a choir will not convince the audience. They argue over who is singing out of tune — when in fact they all are. With the beginning of the pandemic, the party went into a steep decline. In the last elections to the Bundestag DIE LINKE did not pass the 5% threshold, but was just able to join as a parliamentary group due to three constituency mandates won in Berlin and Leipzig.
More horseshoes, less progress
The “horseshoe alliance“ became unbearable for the other currents in the party, and a “counter-horseshoe“ between “Bewegungslinke” and “Progressive Reformers“ was beginning to form. At the last national congress in June, Wagenknecht was completely isolated. Her positions, for example, on the war (effectively removing all criticism against Russia) were marginalised to a point that in the debate nobody spoke in favour of it. Also in the elections for chairpersons and the national committee the “horseshoe” candidates lost or withdrew their candidacies after their defeat was foreseeable.
The defeated stated that a conference would be held in autumn “to discuss next steps” — and everybody knew what was meant with that: To launch a new party. But the conference hasn’t happened yet, and it seems that Wagenknecht is playing for time — partially to gather her troops, but also because timing is key in politics. As irreconcilable the dispute in DIE LINKE is, and as certain a split seems, it seems that the process could be more drawn out. Explosive class struggles around inflation and the energy crisis could increase the speed of the split, as it could create a narrative for a new party: That “only the Wagenknecht party would represent the movement of workers and poor”, while DIE LINKE would “stand by idly, being worried about the presence of elements within the movement, that would not be ‘woke’ and ‘left liberal’“ enough”.
The latest time for a departure would be autumn 2023, after the elections in the state of Hessen, which would very likely be another defeat for DIE LINKE. A new party could then premiere in the European Elections in 2024. Tactically, the Wagenknecht wing would prefer to be kicked out with a bang rather than splintering off themselves. But the party’s statutes and the peculiarities of German law make that virtually impossible. Only DIE LINKE’s parliamentary group in the Bundestag could expel Wagenknecht from its ranks — and it won’t, both because several MPs support Wagenknecht and because they’re collectively frightened of a split reducing the membership to fewer than 35. This would mean they’d lose the status of a parliamentary group, and by that drastically lowering speaking times for MPs and the number of aides they can employ at the states’ expense. Still, the new anti-Wagenknecht alliance, with its majority in the leadership of the party, is trying to accelerate the split by passing resolutions against Wagenknecht and her positions as well as harshly criticizing her in the media.They hope that “a terrible end is better than unending terror”. The end of the everlasting conflict might bring some recovery, maybe even some new members that were repelled by Wagenknecht’s problematic positions. But in some regions that are dominated by the Wagenknecht wing, the party would disappear completely.
Potential of a new party
In the end a new Wagenknecht party could form, possibly in the form of a “movement” with insufficient local structures and confined internal democracy. It would have some limited potential in elections, but Wagenknecht’s supporters completely overestimate figures. A poll suggested that 30% “could imagine” voting for a Wagenknecht party. In eastern Germany that goes up to 49%. Especially voters of DIE LINKE (67%) and of the far right AfD (68%) would consider that. But a party without regional structures, unable to lead campaigns and completely relying on bourgeois media that have a hate-love-relationship to Wagenknecht would seriously limit the voting potential and its ability to mobilise voters — especially given the political competition that it would face.
On the one hand there is the AfD, who no longer even tries to hide its racism and nationalism. Smaller parts of the working class may fall for their social demagogy and vote for them despite their racism. But the majority of AfD voters are convinced believers in “Germany first” — not really the voters Wagenknecht would like to rally around her. The dominant factor of the AfDs strength in the future will be the narrative currently pushed by bourgeois media: “Protesting against the government and being against the war is right wing.” Given this background it is likely that the AfD would be seen as the more credible protest vote than Wagenknecht.
DIE LINKE would be the other competitor, and politically the more challenging one. When their voters say that the party “doesn’t care enough for working class people”, they usually don’t really mean that it cares “too much for oppressed minorities and the climate” — but that they are unhappy with DIE LINKE not being anti-establishment enough! It is unlikely that they will vote for Wagenknecht en masse, even if she is by far the most popular figure of DIE LINKE.
Prospects
The most likely result will be two (more or less left) parties that don’t pass the 5% threshold. This would be a serious blow for the left as a whole. With all its weaknesses, DIE LINKE has been an important factor in changing the political landscape. The constant resistance to neoliberal policies made it much more difficult for the ruling class to carry on with their attacks on living standards since the formation of DIE LINKE. Also, the party provides structures, material resources, and acts as an amplifier for the whole left.
This is not an obituary. DIE LINKE is not dead yet. But it will be more difficult in the future, especially if the “Bewegungslinke” does not break with the Reformers. If they don’t, the reformers will stay in the driving seat of the party, not being able to steer it away from the cliff, because at any price they want to be with the establishment parties that are ahead of them. The Reformers want DIE LINKE to be less controversial, and more “constructive” towards the SPD and the Greens. For this they are trying to push through their agenda, namely giving up the principled opposition to militarism, the biggest hurdle to being a potential coalition partner on a national level. And it seems that they are successful in dragging “Bewegungslinke” to the right. In their last national meeting they adopted a motion calling for “increasing economic and diplomatic pressure” on Russia and to limit “the financial and economic capacities to lead the war”. In other words: increase sanctions and the economic warfare of NATO and its allies, whose main victim is not the Russian Oligarchs and their “New Tsar” Putin, but the Russian working class.
The declaration of the conference of the “Progressive Left” explicitly states that “without participating in governments . . . there’s no sustainable solution for solving the challenges of the country and the world”. This is a fundamental error. The root of the crisis of DIE LINKE is not just Wagenknecht and her supporters, even if they indeed act against decisions of the party constantly. The reformers do the same, like Thuringias Minister-President Bodo Ramelow, who publicly argued in favour of the delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine, against the explicit decision of DIE LINKEs national congress. The root of the problem is the pressure that DIE LINKE is under: The party and its programme are a political expression of the class struggle. But it is confined within the bourgeois parliamentary system, and the majority doesn’t see a concrete way out of it. DIE LINKE is not revolutionary, but big parts of the programme could only be achieved through a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. The more “realistic” path for change seems to be the participation in governments, playing along with the bourgeois parties by their rules of the game. This contradiction leads not only to conflict, but also to a creeping conformity withthe status quo. The party is losing its unique characteristic as a voice expressing a rejection of the system, and instead is becoming another party managing the system, albeit with more “progressive” vocabulary. Neither wing in the current party internal conflict offers any solution to this problem.
A split seems unavoidable. In the worst case, if the split occurs and the reformers succeed, there would be two variants of right-reformist parties, both unsuitable as an instrument in the class struggle. In the best case, the split would open up a continuing process of clarification within DIE LINKE, and the fundamental questions would be debated with the same vigour as the question if DIE LINKE should be one with or without Wagenknecht.