Jokowi Presidency: How Can the Working Class Resist the Attacks?

August 10, 2022
Christian Pistor || LSP/PSL — ISA in Belgium

Part 1. Indonesia under Jokowi

A change of face…

When Jokowi, as the president is commonly known, was first elected to the presidency in 2014 Times Magazine described him as a “new hope”. Indeed, he was unique in Indonesia’s presidential history in so far as he came neither from the political elite nor from the military brass. He was a “self-made man”, born in a slum, later a furniture exporter, mayor of his hometown of Solo, and finally governor of Jakarta, the nation’s capital.

In 2014 it was feared that his main opponent during the presidential race, general Prabowo Subianto, would usher in a return to a sinister past. Indeed, Prabowo had committed numerous crimes as special forces commander under dictator Suharto (his then father-in-law), notably repressing the East Timorese independence movement and disappearing Reformasi activists. Promising to “make Indonesia great again” Prabowo was also deepening his alliance with right-wing islamist forces. For those preoccupied with human rights and the democratic gains seen after the end of Suharto’s rule, the choice was clear. With his “pro-poor” rhetoric Jokowi attracted the support of civil rights organizations, including environmental and labor groups.

But not a change of substance…

Yet, from the outset, despite his populism and clean image, there were clear signs that Jokowi would rule in favor of capital at the expense of the working class and rural poor.

Already as governor of Jakarta, while implementing some popular health and education policies, Jokowi refused union demands to increase the minimum wage. Soon after his election as president he dramatically cut fuel subsidies, hitting poorer layers of society hard.

Moreover, with his own Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) never gaining dominance in parliament, Jokowi’s power also rests on deals made with Indonesia’s old oligarchic elite. His 2014 running mate for vice president was Jusuf Kalla of the Golkar Party, the party founded by Suharto. This alliance was arranged by Megawati Sukarnoputri, herself a two-time post-Reformasi president, and daughter of Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia.[i]

In 2019 Jokowi once again successfully faced off against Prabowo. As in 2014, Prabowo made unsubstantiated claims of election fraud causing his supporters to riot. Nevertheless, Jokowi subsequently invited Prabowo and his Gerindra party into the ruling coalition, giving Prabowo the defense ministry. The current ten party coalition, the Onward Indonesia Coalition, holds 471 out of the lower house’s 575 seats.

Still couched in populist language, Jokowi’s Development Masterplan 2020–2024 focuses on the neoliberal developmentalist “three-word mantra infrastructure, deregulation, and de-bureaucratization.”[ii] Indeed, in his service to capital he has proven a worthy successor to all his predecessors, including Suharto.

Enter the religious right…

In late 2016 the 212-movement (2 December was the first mobilization) mobilized huge rallies of 200,000 or more. Participants ranged from Muslim traditionalists to Salafists to trade union members. Their aim was to bring down the governor of Jakarta known as “Ahok” and have him jailed for alleged blasphemy against the Quran. The movement fed not only on religious bigotry and racism, Ahok being a Chinese Christian, but also on legitimate social resentment. Indeed, Ahok was notorious for implementing a program of slum clearances of unprecedented ruthlessness.

Jokowi ably coopted right-wing Islamic forces. In his 2019 run for office, his running mate was Ma’ruf Amin, a conservative Muslim cleric and former supreme leader of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the world’s largest Islamic organization.

Alongside the military, this organization has been one of the pillars of capitalist rule in the archipelago. During the 1965–1966 extermination of the Parti Kommunist Indonesia (PKI), forces such as the Nahdlatul Ulama’s youth wing, the Ansor Youth Movement, served as valued auxiliaries in the slaughter.[iii]

Jokowi has been forced to crack down, though, on some violent Islamic groups with a more jihadist orientation. Such groups not only target oppressed nationalities such as West Papuans and murder people of other faiths (notably Christians); they are also a menace to the left and the public at large. One such group, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), was disbanded in 2020. This group had earlier enjoyed the support of some politicians and parts of the military brass. It had collaborated with the military and police on several occasions, for instance shutting down public debates held by LGBTQ+ or Ahmadiyya activists.[iv]

Compromised labor leadership

Clearly, there is a danger that if left wing forces don’t address the rot in society, far-right forces may step in and gain mass support. The ruling class knows very well how to use such forces to their advantage.

Throughout the world powerful figures in the labor movement, essentially union bureaucrats, commonly seek to accommodate themselves with the capitalist establishment. This is also the case in Indonesia. Said Iqbal, chairman of the KSPI, one of the country’s largest union confederations, has a particularly troubling record. In both the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections he backed Prabowo against Jokowi. Allegedly, Iqbal had been promised the position of manpower minister by Prabowo. After Prabowo’s renewed loss Iqbal joined Andi Gani, head of the Jokowi aligned KSPSI confederation, in assuring the president of his support.[v] Perhaps not incidentally these two union confederations, the KSPI and the KSPSI, the largest in the nation in terms of membership, are splinters of the defunct SPSI, the only legal union under Suharto’s rule.[vi]

Said Iqbal has gone even further, though. During the 212-movement the leadership of the KSPI specifically set up worker coalitions to further inflame religious sentiment. These played a role in mobilizing workers to take to the streets of Jakarta in the reactionary anti-Ahok ‘Defend Islam Actions.’[vii]

Luckily there also exists a more progressive independent union tradition in Indonesia, which however is much smaller in terms of membership size. The union coalition GEBRAK and another coalition around the union SEDAR have endorsed neither Prabowo nor Jokowi.[viii]

State of organized labour movement

Already prior to the recent counter-reforms Indonesia’s union movement was in a weakened position and seeing some negative trends. Although Indonesia is experiencing some of the most rapid urbanization in Asia, the majority of the country’s workforce works in the informal economy. Indeed, there have been more jobs created in the informal than in the formal sector. A mere 6% of registered companies operate with collective bargaining agreements. From 2007 to 2019 workers covered by collective bargaining declined by 20%. Unionization among employees currently stands at only 5.2%.[ix] While the number of unions has exploded (currently 10,000 labor unions organized in 161 federations and 17 confederations) registered union membership has fallen from 9 million in the early 2000s to just 3.2 million.[x] Union busting through the unilateral dismissal of union activists, and the impact of labor flexibility, particularly in the form of outsourcing have played a major role in this. The proliferation of unions may be related to the lack of a focal point for the union movement, a legacy of the PKI’s destruction. It will undoubtedly also be related to the uninspiring leadership at the head of the largest union confederations.

Despite very trying circumstances Indonesian workers remain combative with strikes being a frequent occurrence. The PT Freeport Grasberg copper mine in West Papua, for instance, has seen over a decade of labor unrest, with initial gains in conditions met by subsequent union busting efforts. 4,200 workers fired for ‘illegal strike’ activity in 2017 have faced years of struggle for reinstatement, including being shot at by security forces. The fired workers were vindicated in the Supreme Court late last year.[xi] Besides such protracted struggles there are also straight-out victories. In January 2022 continuous protests by unions paid off with the Jakarta governor announcing a 5.1% rise to the minimum wage. Under cover of the covid-19 crisis employers had initially offered no more than 0.8%.

Economic outlook amidst geopolitical uncertainty

The government has big ambitions for Indonesia, an aspiring BRIC member with a population of over 270 million. At first sight, the country’s economic outlook appears relatively good. After the covid-linked recession in 2020 (-2.1%) and slower growth in 2021 (+3.7%), the Indonesian economy is projected to be back on track for annual GDP growth of around 5% which has been the norm for Indonesia these past couple decades. At 4.35% in June, inflation is at a 5 year high, not a 40 year high as in many other countries. However, inflation for food and energy is considerably above this average, impacting poorer households.

However, with the world teetering on the edge of recession, and even China in bad shape, Indonesia’s economy might take a turn for the worse. Moreover, Indonesia risks getting caught up in the geopolitical rivalries which increasingly define the current period.

Indonesia officially pursues a “pragmatic equidistant” approach in its relations with great powers. For instance, it has signed up to China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), while also signing Washington’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Yet it is questionable whether Indonesia will be able to maintain this stance among the intensifying US-China conflict .

On the one hand, China is Indonesia’s chief trading partner. Chinese investments are increasing and surpass investments from the US. On the other hand, Indonesia purchases its weaponry from the US and its Western allies. On August 1. 2022 Indonesia held its largest joint military exercises to date with the US. Australia, Singapore, and for the first time, Japan, also participated in these annual exercises known as Garuda Shield.[xii] Indonesian public opinion is uneasy about the country’s growing dependence on China and favors containing Chinese influence in the region. However, there is also overwhelming opposition to taking the side of the US in a potential military conflict.[xiii]

The limits of state intervention

The national bourgeoisie relies heavily on the state to defend its interests. Mass resistance to neoliberal attacks on the working class and the environment, such as the Omnibus law, is brutally repressed.

The state also takes nationalist protectionist measures, to shore up the long-term interests of the ruling class against its foreign competitors. In February 2022 Jokowi’s government imposed limits on the export of unprocessed minerals, a measure intended to boost domestic downstream processing. The government has plans to make Indonesia the second largest stainless-steel exporter after China.[xiv] Indonesia has the world’s largest reserves of nickel, an important ingredient in steel and battery production for electric vehicles. The government has also pursued a policy of nationalizing important oil blocks while at the same time trying to lure multinationals back with the prospect of major gas finds.[xv]

However, given the increasingly volatile world situation, the state is also forced to take stop-gap measures. In Indonesia, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine resulted in soaring cooking oil prices and local shortages. To protect the local market the government first restricted palm oil exports before imposing a total export ban. As an unforeseen consequence, local farmers already suffering from rising fertilizer prices were left sitting on their produce.[xvi] Moreover, since Indonesia accounts for about a third of global edible oil exports, shortages internationally were exacerbated.[xvii] The inherent danger is a cycle of escalating measures which will hurt the poor worldwide including in Indonesia.

When the state takes nationalist economic measures, it claims to act for the advancement of the entire nation. This is mere propaganda. Just like neoliberal attacks, these measures serve the nation’s capitalist elite. When it suits them, they will ally with foreign capitalists and imperialism to exploit and, if need be, crush Indonesia’s working class. According to Oxfam already prior to the pandemic Indonesia was the sixth most unequal country in the world with four billionaires possessing as much wealth as the 100 million poorest citizens.[xviii]

Part 2. Attacks and Resistance

Authoritarian and reactionary measures

September 2019 saw an upsurge in protests unseen since 1998. The impetus was the news that parliament was preparing several controversial bills; notably one catering to the demands of the mining industry, one attacking the independence of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), subjecting it to the authority of a corrupt parliament, and one making authoritarian and reactionary changes to the criminal code.

The protests took on a mass countrywide character on 23 and 24 September. Students from over 300 universities formed the backbone of the movement, with the GEBRAK union confederation also playing a significant role. Besides opposition to the aforementioned issues, students put out a wide range of demands. These included opposition to measures unfavorable to labor, environmental destruction, and the militarization of regions such as Papua. Clashes with police left five protesters dead and hundreds injured.

The bill weakening the KPK was eventually ratified, giving a freer rein to the co-optation and patronage increasingly central to Jokowi’s rule. The vote on the mining bill was suspended. Yet in May 2020 it passed largely unopposed under the cover of covid.[xix]

The amendments to the criminal code have not yet been passed but are likely to go through this month. Characteristic of the Indonesian government’s opacity, the draft which protesters opposed in 2019 has only been made fully public in July 2022. The latest draft has not been released, the excuse being that it could cause “unrest.”

If it is anything like the 2019 draft, that fear may be justified. According to Human Rights Watch, the latter “may violate the rights of women, religious minorities, and LGBTQ+ people, as well as rights to freedom of speech and association.” The proposed changes include criminalizing the defamation of the president, the government or state institutions. Also criminalized are premarital sex (effectively making all non-heterosexual relations illegal), and some abortions, while the “unauthorized promotion” of contraceptives is prohibited. Blasphemy offenses are expanded to include “persuading someone to be a non-believer.”[xx] Also included are provisions criminalizing individuals who organize peaceful protests without notification with fines and up to six months imprisonment.[xxi]

Freedom of expression is also steadily declining. A new law grants the government sweeping cyber-surveillance powers. Threatened with their platforms being blocked, major technology companies have met a July 20 deadline to register with the Communication and Information Ministry. Under the controversial licensing regime big and popular platforms like Zoom, Twitter, Netflix, Spotify, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Google and YouTube are required to take down content that “incites unrest” or “disturbs public order” within 24 hours of receiving a ministry instruction to do so. As such, the ministry can censor their content and is given access to user data. Some aspects of this censorship, like stopping “child pornography” sound reasonable. However, the vagueness of language defining “incite unrest” and “disturbance to public order” is designed to help crack down on protest.

Omnibus law

The “Omnibus Bill on Job Creation” or just “Omnibus law” was first submitted to parliament in February 2020. The stated aim; to boost Indonesia’s regional competitiveness by creating a business environment attractive to investment. The government touted that this “job creation law” would cut red tape and “lavish mandatory benefits” to workers. The British Chamber of Commerce celebrated the law claiming it would make Indonesia “a genuine and realistic alternative to China” for international corporations seeking to invest. Indeed, while domestic direct investment in Indonesia has increased rapidly in recent years foreign direct investment has largely stagnated.[xxii]

The Omnibus law makes around 1,200 amendments to 79 existing laws and regulations, including the 2003 Manpower law which included concessions to the labor movement. A true “Big Bang” law, it represents an unprecedented attack on the working class.

The provisions include an increase in working hours (including higher overtime limits and a 6-day workweek), reduced redundancy payments, weakened protection against firing, and an end to time limits on temporary contracts. Women are also particularly targeted with the scraping of guaranteed menstrual and paid maternity leave. Sectors barred from private investment are reduced from 300 to 6.

Environment impacted

The agrarian clause of the law facilitates land grabs with little or no compensation.[xxiii] This might prove particularly useful in the relocation of the capital from Jakarta to Nusantara, a city to be built from scratch in the Kalimantan jungle of Borneo, a project which received final parliamentary approval in 2022. Indeed, Jakarta is the fastest sinking metropolis in the world with a third of the city expected to be submerged by 2050. Even more than climate change this is to blame on land subsidence due to aquifer depletion. The move is expected to have a devastating effect on the indigenous people and ecology of Borneo.

The Omnibus law scraps environmental impact studies except for “high risk” projects, foregoes environmental permits, makes it harder to sue polluters, and reduces community consultation in ventures affecting the environment.[xxiv]

Already prior to this, environmental protection in Indonesia mostly only existed on paper. The country’s rainforests are being destroyed at an alarming rate, notably due to the expansion of palm oil plantations. Mining is also causing extensive destruction. Indonesia is the world’s leading exporter of coal. In 2019 plans were to double domestic coal consumption by 2027, mostly for electricity production. Largely due to deforestation Indonesia ranks fifth in terms of CO2 emissions worldwide.[xxv] At the same time, Indonesia also suffers greatly from climate change. While in 2019 drought impacted agriculture and worsened forest fires, 2020 saw the highest rainfall in decades cause massive flooding.

The movement grows

For the government the economic damage done by covid became an additional argument for passing the Omnibus law. Worker’s rights had to be sacrificed to pay for the crisis. The masses, however, disagreed. As workers faced millions of job losses and collapsing incomes, the Omnibus law only promised more uncertainty and misery for workers.

With the first demonstration against the law on January 13th it soon faced widespread opposition. Even Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), eventually felt compelled to call for the withdrawal of this “oppressive” law which benefits only the rich. Some center-right parties also followed suit. None of these organized any opposition, though. However, a section of the law dealing with the further commercialization of education objected to by NU was withdrawn.[xxvi]

Resistance developed among civil society organizations, environmental groups, students, and organized labor. Many union leaders, however, wasted precious time lobbying the government instead of organizing the fightback. Several unions, especially those affiliated with GEBRAK, boycotted or walked out in the course of the negotiations.[xxvii] The two largest union federations, the KSPI and KSPSI, in August received a government invitation to participate in formulating the law. In fact, they were tricked, and the law was written without them.

In a face-saving move, the KSPI and KSPSI along with 32 other trade unions, made a last moment call for a general strike at a press conference on September 28th. The strike was to be held October 6–8, the three days leading up to the parliamentary vote on the law. To weaken the mobilization the government fast tracked the ratification of the law, passing it on the 5th rather than the 8th. Parliament members had not even seen the law’s final draft.

Thousands held protests in some 70 towns and cities in 18 provinces. The mobilization surpassed those seen in 2019. Despite the last minute call to action the movement showed a new level of organization and coordination. Differing combinations of forces and alliances occurred depending on the cities. There was a clear continuity from 2019 as to who took the initiative for actions, as well as in the social composition of mobilizations. There was evidence “for social opposition forming based on trade unions not linked to mainstream parties alongside student and youth activist groups and critical civil society organizations (environmental, feminist, human rights and others).”[xxviii] Promisingly, KIPRI, the umbrella for the more radical student organizations, merged their mobilizations with GEBRAK due to their similar outlook on trying to build a multi-sector movement.

Due to covid, workers were encouraged to demonstrate at their workplace rather than join larger demonstrations. Said Iqbal, the boss of the KSPI confederation, had boasted that two million workers in 5,000 factories would take part in the strike. This does not seem to have panned out. Parts of the union bureaucracy (probably especially the KSPI and KSPSI) failed to mobilize for the strike. Often strikes were limited to a few union militants “representing” the strike in front of their factory and having their picture taken. In other cases, workers took part in actions after switching shifts. In the few cases where factories were really shut down by strike action, this generally occurred due to rank-and-file initiative. Meanwhile youth, including school students, took the lead in street protests. The repression was fierce with over 6,000 arrested and hundreds held incommunicado.

With much of the mobilizing and coordination work pushed online due to covid, the police also launched a digital counter-offensive with social media ‘cyber patrols’ and disinformation campaign.[xxix] This was the strategy the regime chose in Indonesia’s core areas. Clearly internet blackouts were not an option here as they are for Papuan independence protests.

Much like under the Suharto regime, the government refused to engage with the concerns of the law’s opponents calling them a “hoax” and of fighting for an unproven cause. Indeed, undefined policy revisions between parliament’s approval of the law and the president’s signing of the law one month later prevented the movement from getting a clear picture of what they were up against. Characteristically, Prabowo suggested shadowy foreign forces were manipulating the protesters.[xxx] There were some more major mobilizations around 20 October before the movement died down.

Part 3. What way forward?

Though in many ways impressive, the movement as a whole did not possess a strategy to build a relation of forces sufficient to make the governing coalition tremble. This would have required posing the question of who controls society by escalating strike actions on the part of workers and their auxiliaries, notably the youth. Rank-and-file organizing and democratic decision making through workplace, faculty, school or neighborhood committees would have been the best formula for success. This along with a combative program and offensive demands could have drawn wider layers of society to the struggle.

Looking to the courts…

Having failed to lead the movement in opposition to the Omnibus law, the more establishment friendly union leaders have sought to guide the struggle into safer channels. Said Iqbal was quick to call for the struggle to continue by judicial means. Indeed, the KSPI and KSPSI and 32 other union federations filed a legal challenge to the law.

In November 2021 the Constitutional Court (MK) ruled part of the Omnibus laws unconstitutional on procedural grounds mostly linked to its rushed introduction. The government and parliament were ordered to make amendments to the laws in question within two years. Otherwise, the laws would be declared void by default. The implementation of new regulations was to be put on hold.

Union leaders correctly declared that it was too soon to rejoice and that the law had to be completely revoked. Indeed, the judicial route has only won a short reprieve. Already on May 24th 2022 a bill revising the UU PPP law (Law on Law Formulation) was passed. This legitimized the legislative method of the Omnibus law and thus lays the groundwork for its return.

Labour Party re-founded but to what end?

Another strategy pursued by the union bureaucracy has been the re-founding of the Indonesian Labour Party on October 5th, 2021, a year to the day after the passage of the Omnibus law. During the founding congress, Said Iqbal was the sole candidate for the position of the Labour Party chairman. He explained the need for a Labor Party by the existential threat to the trade union movement posed by the increased precariousness pushed by the Omnibus law.

For union bureaucrats like Iqbal the dramatic undermining of the labour movement also poses a risk to their own position. Yet it is highly doubtful whether this realization has made him a more reliable leader. Indeed, Iqbal wrongly (and shamefully given his own role) concluded that political protests and general strikes were useless to stop the Omnibus law and that this made it necessary to put more pro-labor union and pro-worker politicians into parliament.

As socialists we recognize the usefulness of participating in elections and gaining elected office. However, to defeat counter reforms or win reforms, this strategy must be used in conjunction with the mass mobilization of the working class and the oppressed.

The original Indonesian Labour Party founded in the wake of the Reformasi movement failed to reach the electoral threshold. Time will tell if the re-founded Labour Party will overcome this obstacle. History, though, teaches us some lessons about building working class representation.

Financial resources may be a challenge for parties going against the interests of big business. At least as important, however, is gaining the trust of workers. Overturning the Omnibus law and other significant reforms may be attractive propositions, but accountability and having a winning strategy are just as crucial. Any working-class party seeking to challenge the interests of capital will be at its most effective if it is based on an active membership, with democratic mechanisms to determine strategy and demands. Leaders should be accountable to the rank-and-file (revocable at all times) and not earn more than an average worker. However, the current period is not favorable to the gradual buildup of a mass reformist social democratic party. Today significant reforms will only be obtained by struggles questioning the system in its entirety.

The Labour party appears to have taken an important role in organizing protests against government moves to reintroduce the Omnibus law. For instance, on June 15th 2022, the day before the UU PPP law commenced, thousands of trade unionists protested on the streets of Jakarta and other industrial centers. A rally of about 10,000 assembled before the house of representatives (parliament). Yet the question is: Are these protests part of a strategy to defeat the Omnibus law or a means of building Labour Party support for the elections in 2024?

Drawing lessons from the past

When The PKI was destroyed in the 1965–1966 anti-Communist purge it was the world’s largest communist party outside the one-party states of the USSR and China. Affiliated trade unions, peasant, youth, women’s and cultural movements claimed the support of 20 million people, nearly a quarter of the country’s population.[xxxi] The slaughter effectively destroyed the organized left. Only with the Reformasi and the end of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ was the left able to truly start rebuilding its forces.

For all the establishment vilification of the PKI, the latter went down virtually without a fight due to its grave lack of a class struggle strategy. Based on its stagiest understanding of social change and revolution the PKI sought a compromise (popular front) with a supposedly “progressive” anti-imperialist and anti-feudal Indonesian bourgeoisie allegedly represented by President Sukarno. The reality was that no such “progressive” local bourgeoisie existed. The interests of these local exploiters were diametrically opposed to those of the masses. Too weak to rule through a parliamentary democracy this class found its salvation in bloody military rule.

Yet, Indonesia’s ruling class still trembles before the specter of the working class drawing the correct lessons from the past. Alleged links to communism are still routinely used to slander and intimidate political opponents. As late as 2019 even Jokowi himself was attacked by a general for his parent’s alleged proximity to the PKI. [xxxii] In 2018 an environmental activist received 10 months in jail for displaying a hammer and sickle while protesting a gold mining company in East Java province. The maximum penalty for spreading Communist ideology is 12 years in jail.[xxxiii] Undoubtedly this remains an obstacle to openly discussing revolutionary change.

Combative workers and youth in Indonesia are rightfully passionate about defending the legacy of the Reformasi. It is laudable to try to uphold “good governance” by holding the government accountable to democratic ideas, maintaining free and fair elections and reforming institutions. However, no amount of democracy under capitalism is ever going to end exploitation of workers, end particular oppressions (women, LGBTQ+, etc.), resolve the national question or allow for environmental sustainability.

The revolutionary socialist path

Under capitalism all gains will sooner or later be put into question. The ruling class is buckling down the hatches. United behind Jokowi it seeks to remain competitive internationally by ramping up the exploitation of workers and the environment, all the while upgrading the repressive tools with which it hopes to smother future social explosions. The wholescale attack the Indonesian working class is faced with today has many parallels in countries across the world, countries running the gamut from the most impoverished former colonies to the richest and mightiest imperialist powers. We all live in a world marked by extreme capitalist disorder which combines inflation, recessions, food crises, war, pandemics, and environmental catastrophe. The problem is global and is called capitalism.

Our class can only fight to overturn this system by organizing ourselves internationally to bring socialist change. Together we can learn from our experiences, and applying the Marxist method, develop a winning strategy. Socialists must be the most radical defenders of democratic rights. Under socialism we can take democracy to a level unseen in human history. Only under socialism can we end exploitation, foregoing competition and the race to the bottom. With the economy placed under democratic public ownership the toiling masses can organize the economy to meet human needs while preserving the environment. Only under socialism can particular oppressions be overcome and can oppressed nationalities (such as the Papuans) achieve their national rights, including the right to independence if they so choose. By fighting all forms of oppression, we can forge the class unity needed to overcome the rule of our exploiters, of those steering our world into an inferno. We live in an era of revolution and counterrevolution. Ultimately it is a choice between life and death. We chose life, we chose socialist revolution.

[i] https://time.com/105650/indonesias-obama-is-actually-nothing-of-the-sort/

[ii] https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/55878/Saifullah-Aip_MA_2019_20_AFES.pdf

[iii] https://internationalsocialist.net/en/2020/11/book-review

[iv] https://muse.jhu.edu/book/19359 The Ahmadiyya are a syncretic Muslim sect. The 1965–1966 purge also targeted the Abangan, a Javan people practicing a syncretic rather than an orthodox version of Islam. The PKI enjoyed extensive support among this group.

[v] https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/30/labor-leader-previously-backing-prabowo-now-declares-support-for-jokowi.html