The 15 May legislative elections were the first to be held amidst the country’s ever-deepening crisis, a crisis which has driven the majority of the country’s population into poverty. They were also a test after the mass uprising of 17 October, which rejected the country’s neoliberal sectarian political system. Do the elections confirm the continued weakening of this system? What do they say about the crisis of working-class political representation in Lebanon? What type of independent politics can offer a way out of the crisis?
Unexpected twists in run-up to elections
The last years have seen plenty of political instability and deadlock. The outgoing government of Najib Mikati was formed on 10 September 2021. This followed thirteen months of wrangling after the resignation of Hassan Diab’s government following the Beirut port explosion. However, a month into the Mikati government Hezbollah and Amal began a three-month boycott of cabinet meetings amid a dispute over the investigation into the port blast.
In March an additional point of uncertainty was introduced to the upcoming May elections. After earlier proclaiming his departure from politics, former prime minister Saad al-Hariri announced that the Future Movement was withdrawing from the race and called for a boycott of the elections. The political vehicle of the Hariri family dynasty, the Future Movement had dominated the Sunni constituency for decades. In 2018 the party had won 20 out of the 27 seats set aside for Sunnis.
With incumbent Prime Minister Najib Mikati likewise announcing he wouldn’t run, no prominent Sunni figurehead was left in the race. This resulted in a scaremongering campaign that the resulting political void would benefit Hezbollah backed Sunni candidates.
No parliamentary majority
In the end, however, many Sunni votes went to independents. The March 8 Alliance, the block around Iran-backed Hezbollah, did not fare well in the elections, losing its parliamentary majority. Although it and its Shia ally Amal kept all the seats allocated to the Shia community, its other allies suffered heavy losses. The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), the party of President Michel Aoun, and formerly the Christian party with the largest parliamentary representation, suffered the most significant losses with its vote declining by 48%.
Within the Christian constituency the US and Saudi backed Lebanese Forces (LF) led by Samir Geagea made important gains and now hold the most seats.
Despite this, the opposition March 14 Alliance, to which both LF and the Future Movement belong, likewise failed to gain a majority. With what amounts to a hung parliament this opens the perspective of more political instability and deadlock. Officially, however, there seems to be consensus about passing an IMF deal.
Gains for Independents
In a historical first, candidates who took part in the 2019 protests and present themselves as independent of the sectarian parties captured 13 out of the parliament’s 128 seats, seven of them Sunni seats. The remainder were Christian seats and one Druze. Independents won seats in all of Lebanon’s five provinces, in both urban and rural areas.
A couple of factors favored the independents. For one thing, Sunni voters largely ignored Hariri’s call to boycott the elections with many ending up voting for the independents. Overall, voter turnout was low at 49%. However, this was similar to 2018, before the onset of the crisis.
Secondly, the diaspora vote appears to have in several instances tilted the balance in favor of alternative parties creating surprise victories against established figures. In fact, initial voter turnout estimates had to be revised upwards in part due to stronger than expected turnout (63%) among registered voters living abroad.
Staying power of sectarian forces
Overall, the sectarian parties have still largely been able to maintain their grip on power. The Shia parties have been particularly successful in this, but so have the Lebanese Forces.
In part, this may be down to political apathy as expressed by low voter turnout. Independents may also have failed to convince those fighting for their daily survival.
Moreover, the elections saw sectarian parties use intimidation and violence to ward off challengers. Such accusations have been leveled against Hezbollah and Amal in particular.
Perhaps most importantly, the sectarian parties have stepped up their clientelist provision of social support to significant segments of their constituencies at a moment of desperate need.
Examples abound. For instance, Geagea’s LF has distributed bread and fuel coupons to its supporters as well as medicines free of charge or at reduced prices. In one region a public transport network was set up for supporters. Various sectarian political forces have also used corona vaccine access to shore up their base.
Remarkably, Hezbollah has been able to expand its clientelist network throughout the crisis. It provides its Shia base with electronic cards giving access to cooperatives selling food at reduced prices. It has also issued 200,000 microcredits to supporters.
Hezbollah has successfully circumvented US sanctions importing Iranian oil via Syria. This oil is provided free of charge to institutions such as public hospitals, the Lebanese Red Cross, civil defense forces, and orphanages. This reinforces Hezbollah’s strategy of directly and indirectly controlling parts of the state apparatus while boosting its image as a force resisting US imperialism.
However, by some accounts a factor in the losses suffered by Hezbollah allies may be related to Hezbollah’s fading prestige on this front. Indeed, its role in fighting Israel is receding into the past.
Yet there was a shift…
The reason for the Future Movement’s withdrawal from the elections is a vital conundrum. Hariri’s embroilment in international lawsuits, notably in Turkey, due to his business dealings may have played a role. However, more fundamentally, the withdrawal of his party (and of a figure like Mikati) is an admission that these political forces could no longer achieve their objectives under the present circumstances. There are indications that the sectarian political system has been left particularly weakened among the Sunni community. Has the system’s weakest link begun to break? This would be a positive development favoring the building of working-class unity across the sectarian divide.
On the other hand, the geopolitical circumstances of the Future Movement’s withdrawal may be more ominous. Having grown increasingly dissatisfied with the party’s inability to reign in Hezbollah, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia appear to have switched their support to the Lebanese Forces. This may signal outside pressure for a sharpening of the conflict between the March 14 and March 8 alliances.
Indeed, parties such as LF may have been successful at making the elections a referendum about Hezbollah weapons. Hezbollah for its part played on a sense of encirclement by foreign and domestic opponents to maintain its core supporters.
Stirring up sectarian tensions and impunity
Already on 14 October 2021, we saw a reminder of the dangers of sectarian violence. That day saw the eruption of the worst street fighting since 2008.
Hezbollah was calling for the removal of Bitar, the lead judge probing the catastrophic port explosion of August 2020. They accused him of political bias, which is to say he was only going after figures from the political bloc around Hezbollah. As supporters of Hezbollah and its ally Amal gathered to protest near the Beirut Palace of Justice they came under sniper fire from a Christian neighborhood which is a stronghold of the Lebanese Forces. The ensuing four or five-hour gun-battle along the civil-war era frontline left six dead and dozens injured. Although a return to the days of the civil war appears unlikely, this incident demonstrates how Lebanon’s established political forces will stop at nothing to channel yearnings for justice and accountability into sectarian channels.
Meanwhile tragedies are left to repeat themselves. In August 2021 a tanker truck exploded in Tleil, Akkar District, the poorest part of the country with the highest level of illiteracy. At least 33 were killed, many more injured. Locals blame three of the region’s parliamentarians, members of major feudal landowning families, for being behind the smuggling operation that caused the disaster. Two are from Hariri’s Future Movement, the other from Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement. From opposite sides in the game of sectarian politics, all of them neglected their region, jointly profiting from and ultimately endangering their constituents. This goes to show the common class interest of rival sectarian parties.
Many shades of ‘Independents’ enter the scene
The newly elected independents do not have a centralized leadership, do not belong to any one party or even to one electoral list. In many cases independents competed for the same seats. The fact that the 2019 mass movement did not find a more united political expression may be seen as a weakness. While there is some truth to this, as socialists we would not advocate opportunistic alliances.
It is important to remember that this was a very broad movement. While on the one hand, it expressed a rejection of sectarianism and neoliberalism, organized working class participation was largely absent. Working-class people participated in mass but did so as individuals. This undoubtedly influenced the subsequent political expression of the movement.
Clearly, the political outlook of the newly elected independents varies widely. Forming a parliamentary bloc with a coherent program seems an unlikely prospect. Indeed, such a unity would be unprincipled and might present an obstacle for the independents closest to the working class moving left under pressure from below.
The range of views held by independents may range from progressive, to liberal, to highly reactionary. On the issue of refugees, for instance, one can find a dramatic illustration of this.
On the one hand, there is Cynthia Zarazir elected in a Beirut seat, who in 2016 tweeted “Together for the genocide of Syrians, I don’t care what gender or sect. They’ve done nothing but caused trouble to Lebanon”. She has since expressed “regret” for her language but not her stance. On the other hand, there is Rami Finge, elected in a Tripoli seat, someone actively involved in assisting refugees (including Syrians) over a quarter century.
A clear break with the sectarian parties?
Neither have all independents made a clear break with the sectarian political system. Despite their independent label some do not shy away from associating themselves with particularly nauseous sectarian forces. These compromises are done in the name of building an opposition alliance against the Hezbollah dominated government.
Taqaddom, a party which emerged from the 2019 movement saw two of their candidates elected. Despite describing itself as a democratic progressive party it appeared on a list dominated by the Kataeb Party (or Phalanges). The Christian Phalanges militias were responsible for the notorious 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre of Palestinian refugees.
The independent label may help such liberal parties dissociate themselves from the sleaze associated with traditional sectarian groups. In practice, however, they align with the bloc around the Lebanese Forces which claims the mantle of opposition.
This is rightfully rejected by other independents.
Liberal reformism or class struggle
Besides the question of alliances with sectarian parties there is another crucial question that independents need to answer. Are all of Lebanon’s ills derived from its rotten sectarian political system or is it capitalism more generally which is at fault? The independents who only see the former as the problem may agree with many of the reforms proposed by the IMF and may consider the accompanying austerity as a necessary evil. Perhaps in the upcoming period they may feel compelled to support the formation of a government, possibly of technocrats, which seeks to gain the confidence of the IMF and investors.
A preliminary assessment would suggest that none of the independents have a rounded class analysis or critique of capitalism. Indeed, even the more promising independents see themselves first and foremost as civil society activists. Some, undoubtedly, have stronger links to the struggles of the working class and poor than others. These might be expected to take positions resisting austerity measures.
Melhem Khalaf, as President of the Lebanese Bar Association, has played a prominent role in independent organizing among professional layers. Then there is the architect and city planner Ibrahim Mneimneh who won a Sunni seat as part of the list Beirut Resists. Following his involvement in the 2015 waste protests he unsuccessfully ran for municipal and parliamentary office. In a speech following his recent election he emphasized his opposition to the sell-off of state assets and attacks on living standards and rights. Elsewhere he emphasized that in the face of the sectarian elite’s multiple means of obstruction and pressure, the strongest tool of independents was to rally the street. His program emphasizes accountability for the Beirut blast, an end to clientelism, and the replacement of the sectarian system of governance by a “secular, democratic and just system”.
Economic and social crisis
The collapse of the Lebanese economy is close to unprecedented in modern history and so is the depth of the social crisis. In fact, the economy contracted about 58 per cent between 2019 and 2021. As of January 2022 unemployment stood at nearly 30%, nearly three times higher than in 2018–2019. Poverty now stands at 80% and extreme poverty at 36%.
This is a compounding crisis. The collapse of the financial system in 2019 and the subsequent sovereign debt default produced a collapse of the national currency. After some months of relative stability, the black-market value of the Lebanese pound has again fallen sharply since the elections. The Lira has lost about 95% of its value. This has been the main cause for the galloping inflation. The bankruptcy of the Lebanese state also made importing essentials such as food, medicine, and fuel difficult. The corona pandemic further compounded the crisis. In recent months the worldwide rise of commodity prices, further intensified by the war in Ukraine, has added to an already catastrophic situation.
Annual consumer price inflation in April 2022 reached 206%. For food and beverages this was 375% bringing food inflation since the start of the crisis to over 1000%. Annual inflation in areas such as transport, health, electricity, gas, and other fuels was even higher. On the one hand, this reflects the effect of the war in Ukraine on the prices (and supply) of food and fuel. For wheat and cooking oil Lebanon is up to 90% dependent on Russian and Ukrainian imports.
The past year has been marked by endemic power outages due to fuel shortages. The state electric company is currently only providing two to three hours of electricity a day. Expensive private generators for additional power are available only to those who can afford them. There is no end in sight to the crisis. The government is set to further cut subsidies on medicine. Inflation is bound to keep rising.
An IMF deal?
Since the elections the caretaker government has reached a preliminary deal with the IMF. The initial bailout would only comprise $3 billion dollars over 46 months, far below Lebanon’s current financing needs. However, the deals’ implementation could unlock an $11 billion in foreign assistance pledged to Lebanon at the 2018 CEDRE Conference. However, this is still dwarfed by the $70 billion losses in the Lebanese banking sector.
But the deal is contingent on a number of strict conditions. These measures, which still need to be approved by the new parliament, include financial sector restructuring, a new banking secrecy law, standardized exchange rates, and reforms to state-owned enterprises. The latter includes introducing public-private partnerships for such as the chronically mismanaged and loss-making energy sector.
Why has no deal been reached earlier in the crisis? Most Lebanese banks are controlled by the sectarian political class and therefore measures impacting the financial industry have been met with obstruction and delays. This has bought time for the Lebanese elite to smuggle $7 billion out of the country, while shifting most of its losses onto public funds and the general public. The present IMF deal’s tacit acceptance of this state of affairs might improve its chances at passing parliament. As all sectarian parties agree that it is the working class and poor who must pay for the crisis, it is the latter who will be faced by additional austerity measures and cuts to social welfare.
Resistance and the need for independent working-class representation
In the face of deteriorating economic conditions and a profound social crisis the past year has seen many defensive struggles.
Repeated protests and strikes have been directed at skyrocketing fuel prices. Indeed, since the government lifted all fuel subsidies last October the cost of one car’s fuel tank exceeds the monthly minimum wage. The “day of rage” on 13 January saw a general strike by transportation workers (many of them self-employed). Roads throughout the country were blocked by taxis and trucks.
Similar protests occurred in December and February. Over the last year there have also been recurring national strikes by pharmacists in the face of shortages in essential medicines.
Public schools have seen months of strikes throughout the present academic year with teachers demanding higher salaries and stipends in the face of the spiraling cost of living. Other demands include adequate health coverage for contract workers and transportation allowances. At the end of March, Lebanese banks saw a two-day strike.
The state-owned telecom sector has also seen its share of strike action. In mid-December of last year workers at mobile operators Alfa and Touch struck to defend their right to health and social coverage. In March, workers went on strike at Ogero Telecom demanding increases in their salaries and social allowances.
With many hospitals facing closure, doctors and nurses have declared a two-day strike at the end of May. Hospitals are operating at under 50% capacity due to power shortages and a large segment of the staff having left the country.
Independent Labor organization
Resistance in the form of protests and labor struggles, while widespread and often protracted, also appears to be largely scattered. Indeed, the Lebanese trade union movement still bears the legacy of the post-civil war period, after 1990. In addition to the disintegrative effects of neoliberal globalization seen elsewhere at the time, including on class consciousness and labor militancy, in Lebanon the unions were also effectively infiltrated and co-opted by the sectarian political parties. This was particularly the case in the public sector where employment is linked to clientelism.
Due to its organic links with the sectarian political elites, the union federation CGTL remained absent from the October 2019 movement. Unfortunately, so far the uprising has not inspired substantial developments in the organization of waged and informal labor. This is an urgent task for the Lebanese left.
Among professional layers, however, the uprising did start a process of alternative labor organizing. Drawing inspiration from the Sudanese Professional Association and its role in the Sudanese uprising (2018–2019) a group of professors founded the Association of Independent University Professors (AIUP). Eventually, a variety of professional groups, most prominently journalists, lawyers, physicians, engineers, architects, as well as workers in the arts and cultural sector, were united under the umbrella of the Lebanese Association of Professionals (LAP). In November 2020, the aforementioned independent Melhem Khalaf was elected President of the Lebanese Bar Association. In July 2021, an independent opposition list also came out on top in the Order of Engineers and Architects. It defeated a list uniting almost all sectarian neoliberal parties. Independent student lists saw victories in university elections in 2020 and to a lesser extent in 2021. Although these are important breakthroughs, the social background of the layers involved undoubtedly also contributes to some of the political limitations of the forces emerging from the October 2019 uprising.
An internationalist revolutionary socialist approach
As socialists, we have no illusions in transforming society chiefly using elections. In Lebanon, despite the recent cracks, the sectarian political system still offers additional obstacles to this course. However, we recognize that participating in elections and gaining elected office can provide a valuable tribune to support the struggles of the working class and the oppressed. Besides popularizing these struggles, we can help lead them to victory by sharing in the lessons of past struggles. Drawing these lessons relies on a class analysis based on Marxism.
So, can the breakthrough of independents during the recent parliamentary elections help rebuild the Lebanese workers’ movement? Yes, if there are at least one or two elected independents who meet the following conditions.
First, they must genuinely be independent from the sectarian parties, not aligning with either sectarian alliance.
Secondly, they must focus their work not on institutional reforms, but on supporting the struggles of the working class and poor, including refugees and foreign workers.
However, the working class cannot rely on individual saviors. Moreover, a much more decisive approach is needed. This is not a period of relative stability favoring the construction of stable broad working-class formations. This is true throughout the globe and even more so in Lebanon. The entire situation cries out for revolutionary change, and constituting a revolutionary force is essential.
Lebanon not alone amidst a world in crisis
Lebanon is not an aberration as the crisis of capitalism is becoming more explosive in country after country. These past weeks the Sri Lankan masses have responded to their country’s collapsing economy by two general strikes unseen in decades. Iran is seeing ongoing protests around rising prices. Similar developments could occur in the Middle East and North Africa in quite short order. This could blow new life into the movement in Lebanon. The rotten sectarian system must go, but replacing it with a “cleaner” form of capitalism is utterly utopian.
Were a new uprising to occur coupled with a general strike, revolutionary socialists would need to propose that democratically elected committees of the workers and poor take over the running of everyday life. Problems such as hoarding and illicit price hikes, against which the government claims to be powerless could thereby be addressed. Capital controls under democratic working-class supervision could stop the plundering of the country. Social services could be wrenched away from the clientelism of sectarian forces and be made available to all. In these and many other ways these committees would prove far superior to the rule of corrupt sectarian politicians and the bosses, who are but one and the same. Previously neglected passive layers of the Lebanese population would be inspired into action. A national assembly of delegates elected by the strike committees would then have to wrest power from the state itself.
Such developments would inspire a wave of solidarity among workers across the world. Under such circumstances Lebanon’s dire situation with regards to essentials such as food, medicine, and fuel could be eased, and real structural solutions found rather than those of the IMF. These would have to include the cancellation of the national debt and the expropriation of the Lebanese bourgeoisie, including their foreign assets. By placing the pillars of the economy under public ownership democratic planning could refashion the Lebanese economy to serve the needs of the entire population. Under a wider socialist federation in the region economic imbalances could be overcome and momentous challenges such as climate change properly addressed.
