Elections with No Choice — UPDATED WITH RESULTS

The Russian regime used to describe the country’s political system as ‘managed democracy’. There is now little democracy left. And the only thing that saves the regime from complete disaster is the lack of an organised opposition with a viable left alternative.

The country is just entering the downside of the third wave of coronavirus. Since the start of the pandemic 600,000 more Russians have died than would normally have done so in a normal period. Medics are warning that a new wave could develop in the Autumn.

The economic ‘rebound’ benefits the big corporations, and the all-encompassing state bureaucracy. Corruption is still endemic. But ordinary people see little if any benefit. Real incomes have declined every year since 2014, personal debt is at record levels and inflation is rapidly eating away any meagre savings people have. Many small businesses are ceasing activity, as witnessed the number of shops and premises lying empty. Nearly one fifth of Russians live under the poverty level, which in Russia is 120 euros a month! Life expectancy, which after its collapse in the years following the collapse of the USSR reached 73 in 2019, is likely this year to drop again to its 1990 level of 70.

Threats and instability

The peak of popularity for the Putin regime was in the period following the take-over of Crimea in 2014. A huge patriotic wave swept the country, sucking in large parts of the liberal and so-called left opposition. But since then, discontent has been growing. Youth protests against corruption and the authoritarian regime kicked off in 2018, followed by nationwide demonstrations against government proposals to increase the retirement age. Despite the break-out of the pandemic, a months long protest shook the far-eastern Khabarovsk region after the elected governor was replaced by the Kremlin. Then was the inspiring uprising against President Lukashenko in neighboring Belarus. Stability wasn’t helped by the short war over Nagorno-Karabakh in August 2020.

At the same time, tensions in the developing cold war increased. Russia gained some pyrrhic victories such as in Syria, or the new moves to ‘integrate’ the Russian and Belarusian economies. But increased international sanctions have strengthened the economic stagnation of past years and allowed the regime to present the country as being under attack. The accusation of being a foreign agent is now widely thrown around.

Widespread repression

The Russian regime is “Bonapartist” — that is it is a regime of crisis in which the capitalist class is not able to rely on the usual bourgeois democratic methods, including multi-party elections to maintain stability. Instead, the state apparatus, the police, the bureaucracy which would normally be subservient to the capitalist class has risen above the classes, to rule by force and even at certain times to act against sections of the capitalist class itself. The ‘liberal opposition’ is not so much interested in democratic rights for the majority, as in defending their own class interests, as that part of the capitalist class that has fallen under the “Bonapartist” repression. But the authoritarian regime that arises from this reflects the weakness, not the strength of the capitalist class. As its social base narrows, the regime has to step up repression against wider and wider layers of society.

Now repression has reached levels not seen for decades. This year alone, even according to official figures, 17600 including over 150 journalists have been arrested for taking part in peaceful protests. In Moscow, there have been three times more arrests in 2021 than in the whole of the previous 15 years. The majority have received large fines or up to 30 days in prison. Some have faced criminal charges with long prison sentences — there are now over 400 long term political prisoners with Moscow and Crimea leading the table. Over two hundred foreigners, mainly from Ukraine and Belarus have been deported.

The attempted poisoning of Alexey Navalny last year was, of course, world news. His organisation — “FBK” — has been defined as ‘extremist’ and practically all its leading figures, even its lawyers, have gone into exile abroad. The police have seized the organisation’s database and anyone even remotely connected to it has been barred from standing in the election. 175 opposition media outlets and NGOs have been declared to be ‘foreign agents’ and forced to shut down, while next week alone there are 6 ‘political’ court cases scheduled.

Most ordinary Russians do not have that option of fleeing abroad, in fact, there is the impression that they are being deserted. This is leading to a certain demoralisation, perhaps most sharply expressed by Anastasia Vasilevna, a doctor who set up the “Doctors’ Alliance” trade union and who was herself recently arrested. On her facebook page she has the following statement:

“During the pandemic we received information support from FBK. But once they no longer needed us, they simply forgot about us. They used us and dumped us. I am very disappointed. The FBK managers are now destroying what we all worked so hard to create….. Now they are sitting in Europe, while others are in prison. Can you see the difference? All those who once believed in him are now facing criminal investigation. And when they imprison us they simply forget about us”.

The “Organised Crime and Corruption Project” (OCCRP) which was involved in the ‘Panama Papers’ investigation is the latest to leave Russia. Its Chief editor Drew Sullivan explained “Right now, our work in Russia can do more harm than good to local journalists”. In effect the local journalists have been left to fight alone, ignoring a key lesson that the best defence is unity and public protest. Fortunately, the Independent Trade Union of Journalists and Media Workers, one of whose Presidents is an ISA member, is still actively defending journalists under attack.

Background to the election

This is the first parliamentary election after last year’s plebiscite to extend Putin’s rule to 2036. As then, the regime is having to resort to serious manipulations to ensure it wins. The truth is that most Russians do not see a party that genuinely represents their interests. Even the state sponsored opinion polls have predicted that turn-out will be only about 50%.

Support for the ‘system’ parties, the four Kremlin approved parties represented in the current State Duma, has fallen in the last two months. Putin’s “United Russia” (UR) has fallen from 42% to less than 30%. The “Communist Party of the Russian Federation” (CPRF) fell from 19 to 16,5%. The right-wing nationalist “Liberal Democratic Party” (LDPR) from 11 to 10% and “Just Russia” from 8 to 5,5%.

Just Russia traces its history back to the early 2000s, when Kremlin ideologues decided that a ‘two party system’ was needed. It unified former right wing-nationalist parties, politicians and military leaders. As the Kremlin’s “second leg” it was presented as social-democratic to balance the “first leg’s” social — conservative programme. Now it has moved to the right calling itself “Just Russia-Patriots for Truth” by promoting as a leading candidate Zakhar Prilepin, a well-known right-wing author, former riot police officer, and propogandist and participant in the military intervention in East Ukraine.

The Communist Party has a certain, but limited independence, despite demonstrating its continuous loyalty to the Kremlin.

First formed in 1993 to succeed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the CPRF represented those bitter, former bureaucrats who lost out in the transition to the market. Led since then by Gennady Zyuganov, it claims to represent working people with demands to reverse pension reforms, and introduce a minimum wage and “people’s power”. It has never waged a series campaign on these issues. But it promotes a firm pro-Russian imperialist foreign policy, criticising the Kremlin for being insufficiently decisive in its intervention in Ukraine. It strongly supported Belarussian dictator Lukashenko during last year’s anti-authoritarian protests. And domestically it promotes patriarchal, anti-LGBT, anti-immigrant and pro-religious policies at every level. It applauded Putin’s suppression of the 2014 ‘Bolotny protests” and demanded firm action against the youth anti-corruption protests of last year. CPRF deputies helped draft the laws against ‘foreign agents’, ‘undesirable organisations’, ‘offending the beliefs of believers’ (mainly Russian orthodox of course) and to allow the regime to block websites calling for protests.

The ‘system’ parties are managed by party leaders to ensure they do no damage to the Kremlin’s proposals. When widespread, largely spontaneous protests developed over pension reforms in 2018, parties such as the Communists and Just Russia stepped in to organize a few, formal protests, before winding them down promising there would be a referendum. They then voted like sheep in the State Duma for the Kremlin’s proposal after a minor concession.

The ‘system’ parties do not dare step out of line as they are fully financially dependent on the Kremlin — the CPRF and LDPR each receive a billion rubles (about 11 million euros) each year from the state budget and JR half a billion rubles. Yet only the CPRF has any independent income, and even it gets less than 10% of its income from subscriptions and other sources.

The “spoiler” parties

To ensure those parties the Kremlin wants to see in the State Duma succeed, a whole series of ‘spoiler’ parties has been created to mop up the anti-Kremlin votes in a safe way. For example, a ‘Green Party’ established several years ago by a pro-Kremlin bureaucrat and a new ‘Green Alternative’, whose main demand is to separate household waste, have been allowed. An alternative Communist Party has been set up with candidates with similar names to that of the CPRF. In one St Petersburg constituency, there are three candidates all looking the same with the same name.

The participation of 14 parties in this way creates the false illusion of a multi-party democracy. Perhaps one of these parties could cross the 5% threshold to get into Parliament — maybe the so-called “New People”, recently set up by a businessman and supported by the Kremlin to win the votes of small business supporters with the hope of further splitting the opposition vote.

Over the years electoral law has changed to ensure the Kremlin maintains its majority. After many used the “Against all candidates” option to register a protest vote, that possibility was removed from the ballot. But now only half of the Deputies are elected on party lists — the rest are ‘single seat deputies’ elected in individual constituencies. Although many claim to be “self-nominated” or independent of parties, most are allied to the “system” parties.

To be nominated 16,000 signatures complete with passport details have to be collected, which in the current environment many refuse as they fear their names will lead to repression. Those ‘independent’ candidates who do succeed have big financial sponsors so that volunteers are paid to collect the signatures, often paying for the signatures too. It costs about 250,000 euros to get nominated in this way. Even then, only those candidates acceptable to the regime are allowed to stand. Those deemed undesirable are either excluded by the courts or a sufficient number of ‘false’ signatures found to rule their nomination invalid. Anyone deemed to be a supporter of Navalny’s campaign is immediately rejected.

Threats and falsification

Even though no serious opposition candidates have been registered, voting has been extended to three days and in several regions, including Moscow, it will be online to boost turnout. Independent observers are no longer allowed. All sorts of incentives are being offered to encourage people to vote — pensioners received a 10,000 ruble bonus in August, for many doubling their monthly pension. In some cities students are offered direct bribes to vote a specific way. Across the country state employees have all been order to vote by 1200 on the first day.

Those who vote online can win flats or cars. And many voters who work for large corporations or for the state, over a third of the electorate, have been told how to vote or face sanctions at work. A special campaign to issue Russian passports with access to pensions to residents of the Donetsk and Lugansk “People’s republics” has seen 600,000 take up the offer. 12 trains and 825 buses have been mobilized to transport them into Russia to vote.

Smart voting

In these conditions, the Navalny campaign has promoted the idea of ‘Smart voting’. Previously, it argued to vote for anyone but United Russia — that tactic failed. So now they have a system to assess which candidate is best placed to beat UR in each constituency. For the party list, they say, you should vote for any of the “system parties” but UR.

Last year, in the city of Tomsk in Siberia, “Smart voting” candidates won 26 out of 37 places in the city parliament — yet still they elected an ER member as Mayor. The same happened in Moscow. When the “Smart voting” recommendations were published, they support the CPRF in the majority of seats, JR in some, and in an unpleasant number of places the right-wing LDPR. In one city, just outside Moscow, their preferred candidate is responsible for the money laundering operations of the local mafia, and not uncoincidentally is the candidate of the CPRF!

The logic behind “Smart voting” is that if enough non-United Russia deputies are elected, this will split the parliamentary majority, weaken the regime and allow at least the restoration of elements of democracy. In effect, they are using the widespread opposition to the current regime as a battering ram, to pierce the regime’s electoral defences, to allow the liberal opposition the chance to come to power.

But what they ignore is that the “system” parties have become so integrated into the regime, they will sooner leap to its defence than help the opposition win. Zyuganov, leader of the CPRF even welcomed the court decision earlier this year to send Navalny to prison.

Socialist Alternative’s position

A recent opinion poll showed that 62% of Russians believe a planned economy is better for Russia than private ownership and market relations. This is the highest percentage since 1992.

Navalny’s investigations into corruption have opened the eyes of many to the nature of Putin’s capitalist system with its golden toilet plungers for the rich and widespread poverty for millions. But to turn this support into something tangible, the working class needs to create its own mass political organisation that puts the struggle for a democratic planned economy at the forefront and links it with the struggle against Putin’s capitalist bonapartism. For this reason, Socialist Alternative argued that voting for any of the “system” parties from a working-class point of view was a mistake.

Even in these difficult circumstances, any legal opportunities to present our position openly are welcome. The five-week period allowed to collect signatures for registration was used to publicly campaign for our candidate Kseniya Bezdenezhnykh, who argued openly for the regime to go, for all political prisoners to be freed, for a minimum wage of 300 rubles an hour with a democratically planned economy. We openly spoke against xenophobia and homophobia. Over 50 people participated in handing out leaflets, flyposting and collecting signatures, no-one met any hostility, and we raised a thousand euros, which covered our costs. With no chance of collecting 15000 signatures, the hundreds we did collect were convinced supporters and we already have new members. We were interviewed by the BBC, tens of national and local media outlets as well as blogs, and also took part in public debates.

Needless to say, the police did not like our activities. On one occasion our whole display was “arrested” and Kseniya sentenced to 15 days in prison.

In the election itself, Socialist Alternative believes a vote for any of the ‘system’ parties as well as the spoilers was not possible. None of them could in anyway be described as socialist. Or even workers’ parties. The possibility was not excluded that there would be individual candidates who would argue against repression and for the release of all political prisoners, who would argue for an increase in social expenditure and wages, would campaign openly against racist, sexist and homophobic policies and be prepared to use their position to build a mass movement, including protests and strikes against Putin’s dictatorship. If, we said, there were such individual candidates they should be supported. But overall, the best tactic is to call for an active boycott — for organization to agitate against the election and to argue for a political alternative spoiling the ballot, using leaflets and posters.

Opportunist abdication of responsibility

Socialist Alternative is used to being attacked politically, for our open campaigning against homophobia, in defence of womens’ rights, for our participation in the youth protests against authoritarianism and for our intervention in Belarus, always arguing for independent workers struggle and socialist demands. But this time an aggressive amalgam of reformist and ultra-left groups, some former “Trotskyists”, some still claiming to be, and miscellaneous Stalinists accused us of helping the Kremlin.

Having abandoned the idea it is necessary to build an independent working-class political alternative, they support the position of “Smart voting”, attacking SA by demanding that we support the CPRF — the same party which not only props up the Kremlin system, but openly campaigns for the Constitution to be amended to give the “Russian” people a privileged position over all the other ethnicities that live in Russia.

One group argued we should simply “conduct communist agitation using the model of the ‘Paris Commune’. Another group has dreamt up “a new current within the CP which stands for a left-wing, clear anti-Putin course”. Yet a third supports candidates of the CPRF, but also JR. The arguments used all boil done to one crude position — we cannot defend a clear class position, we are wrong to criticize the CPRF, we have no option in this situation but to, as one of our leading opponents said: “Vote for the CPRF — no matter what!”

Much of the argument centres around whether or not there is a ‘left wing’ developing within the CPRF. There are individuals who on specific questions have played a reasonable role. One of whom, Mikhail Lobanov in Moscow, has played a role in defending higher education. But they are isolated within the CPRF and fail to raise any criticism of the reactionary policies of its leadership. To gain the CPRF nomination, they have pledged to follow faction discipline if elected. Lobanov goes further — the first demand in his programme is decisive, he calls for a 45,000 ruble minimum wage for Moscow, but other regions, he says, only need 25,000. Others, such as the former Businessman Nikolai Bondarenko from Saratov and Moscow’s Valery Rashkin, who some present as evidence of a new ‘left wing’ openly repeat the CPRF’s position about maintaining the integrity of Russia and defending Russian language, seeing the late Soviet period as a model of democracy. None of them see any role for developing a wider struggle — their aim is to get their hands on State Duma resources to further their own campaigns.

This makes it even more dangerous to give uncritical support to these individuals or the CPRF as a whole, even though our opponents argue:

“we have our position, we can defend it in statements, in our circles and meetings, but in politics and the election we should do the maximum, to win the seat, to get as near as possible to win against United Russia….our programme doesn’t correspond much with Lobanov’s programme, but it is a thousand times more important that Mikhail Lobanov wins, as we understand how politics works”.

How to further the building of a workers’ movement

Socialist Alternative would be the first to support the CPRF in an election campaign if it would in any way further the development of an independent and politically conscious workers’ movement. And it is true that a layer of workers will vote for, and even support the CPRF. But that is also true of the LDPR and even UR, which has been known to lean on a section of industrial workers usually in the defence sector in a populist way against the liberal opposition.

But the most important question is what layers of the working class are attracted to the CPRF. It is the conservative older layer, nostalgic for the USSR, and who have a backward consciousness on social issues such as womens’ rights and the national question. It is no coincidence that the CPRF, including those such as Rashkin and Bondarenko echo an anti-vax mood.

But there is a new working class emerging — young, energetic, which demands freedom and democracy. Young working class women are increasingly involved and none of them will accept the stale, backward and chauvinistic approach championed by the CPRF. It is for this reason we believe it is necessary to maintain our campaign for the independent organization of the working class, with a democratic socialist programme.