The results marked a significant conservative shift in the make-up of Majles, the Iranian Consultative Assembly, which poses a danger of more repression and state violence, while at the same time, the turnout was at a record low, which demonstrated the increasing isolation of the regime as it faces growing anger and mistrust.
As was to be expected, the biggest losers in the election after recent years and months of economic hardship and the latest developments, were President Rouhani and his political camp — the ‘reformist’ forces. They were seen as responsible for price increases and privatizations, but also depicted by the regime as betraying ‘Iranian interests’. They had promised, and failed, to end the US-led sanctions and guaranteed more freedom and democratic reforms.
The elections showed that the era of the ‘reformist’ forces is over for now. At least for the next period, they have lost the trust of the population, and therefore will not be able to play the same important role in opposing the regime as before.
It is very likely that next year Rouhani will be replaced by a right-wing hardliner in the Presidential election. This reflects the fact that the hardliners and forces connected to the powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are becoming more and more nervous. Facing increasing protests and class struggles, these pillars of the regime need to intensify repression, and the isolation of the country. This will be easier without the reformist camp and their attempts to compromise with western imperialism.
But despite the massive propaganda by the regime and the failures of the reformists, which did lead to a certain increase in support for the conservatives, and just two months after the killing, by US Imperialism of one of the highest-ranking Generals and important representatives of the regime, the resurgence of nationalism and ultra-religious conservatism was nowhere near as strong as could have been expected.
The realisation that support for the regime is shrinking led to the formation of an electoral block between different conservative factions for this election. The joint list included the ultraconservative Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Revolution — Stability). Mohammad Ghalibaf, the former Mayor of Tehran and Chief of Police, who will probably become the speaker of Majles plays a key role in this process. Since the start of his military and political career, he has been closely associated with the IRGC. As a result of his influence, the IRGC will gain even more power.
220 out of the 290 seats of the Majles are now controlled by hardliners and ultra-conservatives, and establishment figures close to the Supreme leader Ali Khamenei. It is clear they will use this position to attack the Rouhani-administration, maybe to even push impeachment proceedings. It is not out of the question that they will do this using populist rhetoric and promising social measures in order to calm down workers’ struggles.
These are all indications of growing divisions within the regime and of the fear the ruling elite has of losing control. It is striking that never before in the history of the Islamic Republic has there been such a high number of candidates disqualified by the Guardian Council of the Constitution. More than 9.000 out of the 16.000 candidates were excluded from the ballot. This time even loyal reformist candidates and 75% of former MPs were disqualified.
Rouhani used this in a desperate attempt to promote his agenda, criticising the election process in a very new and radical way. He demanded free elections for “all parties” and said “these are not real elections” — which is not far from calling for a boycott.
Mass boycott
It is clear that neither the parliamentary nor the presidential elections are democratic or represent a real balance sheet of power. The turnout in particular is an indicator of the regime’s legitimacy. The main emphasis of the election campaign this time was aimed at encouraging the population to participate. Khamenei repeated time and again that not voting was a betrayal of the Islamic Republic. In his speech on 18th February, he emphasized that the prestige of the Islamic system depended on the upcoming elections and that they would be nothing less than a “divine test”.
In the last weeks before the election, there were countless calls to boycott the election, although they were not accompanied by any significant public protests. Activists around the country posted videos and photos on social media attacking the regime for the election process. On the election day, many videos were posted showing empty polling stations. On Sunday 23rd, the regime announced a turnout of 42%, with just 26% in Teheran. Although during previous elections, the turnout has been exaggerated, 42% would be by far the lowest turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic. With 58 Million eligible to vote, it seems like the regime has mobilized really all of its followers, reaching the peak of its possible support.
Days after the election, the regime claimed that this low turnout was due to foreign propaganda and the effects of the Coronavirus. But long before the effects of the Coronavirus became known and before the election itself it was clear that the boycott would be huge. For example, a poll conducted by academics in Teheran between 30th January 30 and 5th February with more than, 43.000 respondents determined that 81% were not planning to vote, 93% of those who had voted for Rouhani in previous said they wouldn’t vote.
Even though in many cases, the boycott was not a conscious political statement, it shows the widespread alienation of the people from the regime. While in the past, in contrast to other institutions of the regime, the Majles was partly seen as a place, where controversial debates could take place, this kind of illusion is disappearing.
The aftermath of November’s protests
In the past few months, the country has been in in a new, explosive situation with the outbreak of the widespread protests against the gasoline price increase, the repressive response of the regime, killing at least 1.500 protesters, the assassination of Suleimani and the shooting down of the Ukrainian passenger plane by the IRGC.
The regime has been under more and more under pressure, not least because of the growing protests across the whole region, especially in Iraq. The new level of repression has demonstrated its instability. The anger about corruption, price increases, the regime’s lies after the shooting down of the plane, and especially the shock which followed the brutal crackdown of the protests were the biggest factors leading to the low turnout. At the same time, the election result is more than a snapshot of the current situation, but is part of the unfolding of the deep economic and political crises which are likely to continue over the next years.
The Corona-Crisis
This crisis has now reached a new level with the Coronavirus spreading around the country. It is estimated that Iran is, after China, the country so far most affected by the virus. The mortality rate of 13% is clearly higher than in any other country. Once again, mismanagement by the regime is obvious, with deadly consequences.
The regime is facing a loss of control in dealing with this issue. Even the vice minister of health himself, who was the commissioner to fight the virus, and now the country’s Vice President have been infected. The attempts to downplay the effects have already led to new anger and mistrust. The regime is trying to blame the effects of the sanctions, a claim which is partly true as far as medications are concerned, while it is clear, that the regime’s handling of the virus has been paramount in causing its spread.
The election was held despite the awareness of the regime about the virus, flights to and from the affected regions of China have continued without any safety measures being taken and hospitals are poorly equipped. Healthcare workers frequently post on social media that they have been given no instructions, and report overfilled hospitals and an increasing number of infected, and even dead health-workers and doctors.
For the Iranian people it is getting clear, that the regime considers its economic interests more important than the need to seriously deal with the virus. For example, the airline Mahan Air, controlled by the IRGC, has in all probability spread the virus to Lebanon and other countries, by continuing its flights to transport arms and operatives throughout the whole region.
These elections demonstrate once again that there can be no illusions of improvements coming out of the current regime whether led by reformists or hardliners. Only when workers, youth and other oppressed layers organise and establish their own political party can there be any hope of a solution.